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A History of Young People in the West. Edited by Giovanni Levi and
Jean-Claude Schmitt. Volume 1: Ancient and Medieval Rites of Passage.
Translated by Camille Naish. Volume 2: Stormy Evolution to Modern Times.
Translated by Carol Volk.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1997. Pp. vi1396;
vi1409. $35.00; $35.00.
Eighteen essays by nineteen scholars, 662 pages of text, 110 pages of notes: no wonder
these two volumes provide less a history of young people, as they promise, than a variety of perspectives and insights about their doings here and there. Most chapters are
informative, a few are leaden, their scholarship more evident than style. Volume 1 takes
us from ancient Greece to seventeenth-century Italy, volume 2 continues to the midtwentieth century. Both offer ample, sometimes illuminating, references to art history
and suggestive illustrations; both, unsurprisingly in a work first published in Italy
(1994) and France (1996), dwell heavily on those two countries; and both privilege
social over biological definitions of their subject(s). Therefore the young people they
describe range from striplings to young men. Girls receive some attention, but not
much; their dowries are more interesting than their doings. Women attract notice when
providing social and financial support, as when Guinevere gives Lancelot “abundance
of gold and silver and the sumptuous presents” that permit him to behave generously,
as befits a knight (1:157).
On the whole, though, “youth” here indicates males. That may be just as well since,
as Sabina Loriga opens her essay on the military experience, “War wears the face of
youth” (2:11). That’s poetry, of course; and Loriga demonstrates that this was not really
so in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century armies, where thirty- and forty-year-olds
sometimes outnumbered teens. This began to change with nineteenth-century conscription, which also cleared out young boys, women, and other civilian campfollowers. Military service turned into a rite of passage, and the “class” of draft-age
young gained a new identity. Not war per se, but belligerence, marked youth: blustery,
irascible, and turbulent. If one common theme emerges from the disparate contributions, it is of the young as agents of disruption. Courage, arrogance, ferocity were characteristic of the juvenes that Cicero talked about (1:70); and ferox adolescents, while
spirited, were as reckless and undisciplined as Roland later proved.
Norbert Schindler’s essay, “Guardians of Disorder,” argues that “only the classstratified society of the industrial era” dramatized youth as menace (1:242). Most of the
collection tells a different story. Christiane Marchello-Nizia’s chapter on courtly chivalry characterizes chansons de geste as a “poetics of joyful genocide” and describes
their young heroes as full of “destructive, murderous joy” (1:144). Writing about the
young in medieval imagery, Michel Pastoureau describes them as noisy, turbulent, violent, and dangerous. Green is the color of youth, and impetuous green knights “unfailingly provoke disorder” (1:237).
Elizabeth Crouzet-Pavan’s reflections on young men in medieval Italy, “A Flower of
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Evil,” bristles with contemporary condemnations: dissipation, license, excess, lots of
sodomy (perhaps, as in ancient Greece, pederastic couples represented “the true ideal
of martial comradeship and lofty aspiration”?) (1:16). As in the comedies of Plautus,
spendthrifts dreamed of their father’s death to pay their debts, and sometimes moved
on to parricide in real life. More visibly, bands of violent children, gangs, gang rapes,
vandalism, thieving, and brawls “without cause” or “out of malice” (1:188) demonstrated prowess and made terror reign.
Brutality, arrogance, and self-assertion were not confined to towns. In Grisons villages, described by Schindler, young men were known as Matti—madmen (1:250)—
evocative of recent and contemporary locutions describing reckless belligerents: loco,
fou, crazy. “Wild” village bands, their playfulness close to vandalism, manned local
militias, organized carnival and charivaris, but also frightened folk: “typical of young
men’s behavior” (1:258). They were no different from the village youths whose doings
Daniel Fabre traces in a fine essay on “Doing Youth” ( faire la jeunesse) in an Occitan
village, where the boundary is quickly crossed from the licit “boys will be boys” to
unacceptable “hooliganism” (2:61).
If the disruptive activities of rowdy youth surface less often, though often enough, in
volume 2, that is in part because, as the nineteenth century ends, compulsory elementary schooling and conscript armies conspired to inculcate literacy, civics, hygiene, and
a common language, but also acculturated, domesticated, house-trained, and civilized
more of the young and soothed some savage breasts. Education, as François Guizot
explained, would anchor social order. More or less. Even Jean-Claude Caron’s chapter
on schools features a section on youthful violence that ranged from hazing, ragging,
and interschool brawls to college riots, mutinies, violent rebellions, and bloody battles
put down by armed force (2:151–59).
Sergio Luzzatto’s splendid overview of young rebels and revolutionaries between
1789 and 1917 describes one reason why “young people inspired fear throughout the
19th century” (2:175): politics. Beginning after Thermidor, as Luzzatto tells us, when
gangs of muscadins replaced equally terroristic Jacobins, a variety of Jeunes—young
Germany, young Poland, young Switzerland, Jeunes France, and, of course, young Europe—etched out a revolutionary geography of the continent. “Dangerous Boys,” as
Daumier’s cartoon portrayed them (2:209), attacked old regimes and “Old Corruption”
´
before moving on to attack their elders. As Honore de Balzac warned, increasingly
controlled, restrained, and governed youth “burst out like the boiler of a steam engine”
(2:133). It continued to do so with “dangerous dynamism” (2:291) even under Mussolini; or in the gangs, mobs, and other groups of wild votaries of jazz, “hot,” and swing
pursued by the Gestapo.
All chapters, even dull ones, have interesting things to tell; but some relevant questions are not broached. Religion does not even make the index. The role of nineteenthcentury schools in training rebels and that of twentieth-century schools in keeping
millions off the labor market are ignored. The upswings of juvenile delinquency in
wartime, when the policed surface strains and cracks, are not considered; nor are the
excuses that resistance (and liberation) offer to transgressors. Only a section of the final
chapter provides a cursory look at America in the fifties, encapsulated between the
Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1951 and the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961, and reflected in two significant films of 1955: Rebel without
a Cause and The Blackboard Jungle. Those who have read to that point will know
that, despite its anachronistic presentism, Paul Goodman’s Growing Up Absurd (1960)
reflected continuity, not rupture.
The crowd is lonelier today than it once was, but the need to prove one’s prowess is
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just as ardent; the world is very different, but is no less absurd perhaps than it could
seem in Cicero’s day, or Plato’s, to those poorly integrated in it. Parricide would be less
relevant when fathers are less in evidence than they were, but challenging gerontocracy
(a word coined in the nineteenth century) is as popular; so is hooliganism (another
nineteenth-century coinage for rowdyism of old). The “orgy of order” of new “enlightened” states that discomforts Schindler (1:279) did not go far or last for very long.
Gangs still assert themselves over territory, village, or street, ruling by force and intimidation. More generally, the young continue to disturb. As this review is written, the
New York Times (June 26, 1997) reports that American adults view young people with
alarm or fear and find them “rude,” “wild,” and “irresponsible.” What the young think
about their elders is less accessible. We know what the young, some young, do, not
what they think; and this history, like all histories, reflects documentation bound to
remain one-sided.
Within those limits, one is moved to ask, what else is new? Our daily newspapers
chronicle “the bloody vicissitudes of struggles between factions” (1:202) that CrouzetPavan related to medieval Italy, where “the law of the giovani was a law of total license”
(1:220). “Scoundrels ruled the streets” in medieval cities (1:219), and children were
quick to violence there too (1:218). Not much seems to have changed, not even the
inevitable exaggerations; and nineteenth-century “complaints about the arbitrary reign
of terror imposed by young men’s groups” (1:280) carry familiar sounds to latetwentieth-century ears. On June 23, 1997, the New York Times quoted the pastor of a
Baptist Church in Flint, Michigan, where three teenagers fell to murderous thieves,
describing violent local youths: “‘They don’t have a conscience,’ he said. ‘They will
step on someone just like I step on this blade of grass here.’”
That may not be what the editors had in mind when they set out “to emphasize the
specific nature of youth” and “its marginal or liminal character” (1:1, 2). But there it
is: the centrality of marginal violence is nothing new. The flags over the liminal masses
may change color, but they flutter as ominously as ever.
Eugen Weber
University of California, Los Angeles
The Damascus Affair: “Ritual Murder,” Politics, and the Jews in 1840. By
Jonathan Frankel.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv1491. $64.95.
Making few concessions to the general reader, this rich, detailed, capacious book
plunges deeply into what used to be called “the Eastern Question” from the standpoint
of the Damascus Affair of 1840, a clash of local, international, religious, ethnic, and
political interests over a charge that dated back to the twelfth century in Europe—that
Jews in the ancient Syrian capital had committed a ritual murder, killing an Italian monk
and his servant in order to steal their blood and use it for ceremonial purposes. For
months, as the ghastly process proceeded—interrogating the accused, hunting down
suspects, and torturing supposed witnesses—wild polemics whipped up imaginations
both on the spot and across Europe. To many Jews, it seemed like a return to the Middle
Ages. In response, the Jewish world mobilized in its own defense. In France, the famous
´
trial lawyer and liberal journalist Adolphe Cremieux, vice-president of the Jewish Consistory, spoke up for the Jews, as did the Baron James de Rothschild, whose family’s
wealth and influence were celebrated in the Jewish world. In England, the leading
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champion was Sir Moses Montefiore, president of the Board of Deputies of British
Jews, related to the Rothschilds by marriage, and an acquaintance of the viceroy of
Egypt, Muhammed Ali.
In the classic, 1870 interpretation of this affair by the Jewish historian Heinrich
Graetz, the Damascus Affair was understood as a momentous confrontation between
ancient prejudices and the advancing tide of European civilization. According to this
understanding, the fanatic instincts of the Muslim mob, the corruption of the local authorities, and the blindly antisemitic prejudices of some of the Christian inhabitants of
Damascus had conspired to revive an ancient libel and to defame the entire Jewish
people. To Graetz, and to many subsequent Jewish interpreters, the successful mission
´
to the Middle East of a Jewish delegation headed by Cremieux and Montefiore was a
sign that European civilization was on a march toward the full integration of the Jews,
even as barbarous residues remained, particularly in the mysterious East, and also that
a modern, proud, self-assertive Jewish community was capable of international action
on its own behalf. Thanks to the Jewish campaign in 1840, and with the help of outspoken Christian leaders who brought pressure to bear on the rickety governance of the
Ottoman Empire, and thanks finally to enlightened opinion in Europe, the historic blood
libel was finally discredited. As the author points out, this view of 1840 “expressed the
liberal faith of the Jewish intelligentsia in the period of emancipation” (p. 432), and it
remained the classic view even afterward, when there were ample reasons to reexamine
some of the fundamental premises of that era.
In the first full-dress account of the Damascus Affair in more than a century and a
half, Jonathan Frankel of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem challenges this view in
some fundamental ways and provides a much-needed integration of the affair into its
Middle Eastern and international context. Looking closely at the way the accusation of
ritual murder escalated in Damascus (and also on the island of Rhodes, where a similar
affair played itself out), the author establishes that the mainspring of the accusation was
not the Muslim population but rather the European consular corps, especially the
ˆ
French envoy Count Benoıt Ulysse-Laurent-François Ratti Menton. Unluckily, the Jews
in Damascus became pawns in a highly intricate game of power politics played out
between the various European capitals, the Ottoman leadership in Constantinople, the
ambitious Muhammed Ali in Alexandria, and his subordinate in Egyptian-occupied
Syria, Governor-General Sherif Pasha. Once launched, the affair attracted European
interference like a bear to a honey pot. Newspapers fastened on the sensational side of
the story, and a surprising number of respected journals either supported the accusation
or held its veracity to be an open question. European rulers took sides, too—Count
Metternich in Austria, Lord Palmerston in England, Tsar Nicholas I in Russia, and Adolphe Thiers in France—jockeying for position in a continuing contest for influence in
the Ottoman Empire, a contest that threatened the peace of Europe. Tellingly, the Jews
received the strongest support from the supposedly reactionary Habsburg Empire and
faced the most consistent opposition from the France of the Louis-Philippe, supposedly
heir to the liberal and emancipatory traditions of the French Revolution. Mainly, according to Frankel, this is explicable with reference to power politics, heavily preoccupied with the question of who would hold sway in the Egyptian territories of the Ottoman Empire.
More deeply, Frankel notes at the conclusion of his exhaustive and splendidly researched study, the affair revealed how the new, democratic order in Europe was no
guarantee of Jewish security and “was potentially more dangerous for Jews than the
old” (p. 441). During the affair, myth making about Jews appeared in the most unlikely
places. Demagogic charges and inflammatory rhetoric sprang to the lips of democratic
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politicians and to the columns of otherwise sober publications. And far from disappearing in the second half of the nineteenth century, accusations of ritual murder recurred, drawing on the mythic residues of the Damascus Affair—elements of which
persist in the Middle East even today. The affair also generated a mythology for Jews,
as the author points out. In refutation of the charges in Damascus, Jewish protonationalism came to the surface, as did a Christian protozionism inspired by hopes of converting
the Jews and preparing the way for the coming of the Messiah.
´`
Frankel takes us slowly through this cause celebre, moving from one event, and one
opinion, and one location, and one reaction to the next. This is not a book for the
impatient reader and is not an account with interpretative waystations, enabling one
easily to skim. If there is any information on the affair left out of these nearly 500 pages
it must be truly insignificant. This is a learned, thorough, demanding, wide-ranging,
and carefully considered work.
Michael R. Marrus
University of Toronto
Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain.
Edited by Knud Haakonssen. Ideas in Context, volume 41. Edited by
Quentin Skinner et al.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xii1348. $59.95.
In recent years British historians have shown a renewed appreciation for the centrality
of religion to Stuart and Hanoverian political life. Whether in reappraising the Civil
War, the Restoration, or the “long” eighteenth century, a predominantly secular academy appears to have “found” religion. A collection of essays on the so-called Rational
Dissenters, Enlightenment and Religion provides more evidence of this conversion to
the idea that religion mattered to early modern Britons. This volume attests to the continuing vitality and fruitfulness of this line of historical inquiry, making an important
contribution to the debate over the politics and culture of those Britons refusing to
conform to the established church.
The Protestant Dissent with which this book is concerned dates from the 1660s, when
the government sought to enforce religious orthodoxy in the wake of the Civil War
and Interregnum by penalizing those who could not accept the doctrines and episcopal
government of the Church of England. Not repealed until 1828, the Corporation Act
(1661) and the Test Act (1673) excluded Dissenters from civil and military posts. This
as well as subsequent discriminatory legislation faced eighteenth-century Quakers,
Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Presbyterians, and from these last three
Dissenting confessions, “Rational” or “Enlightened” Dissent emerged as an alternative
to orthodox Calvinism. Extolling a rationalistic and natural religion rather than a revealed one, many Rational Dissenters questioned the doctrine of the Trinity, and some
became full-blown Unitarians. Convinced that neither churches nor governments ought
to impose religious dogma on individual consciences, they championed religious
liberty.
As the editor, Knud Haakonssen, reminds us in his introduction, the story of Rational
Dissent is “exceedingly complex” (p. 7), and indeed the contributors usefully complicate it by overturning a number of received notions. David L. Wykes takes the famous
Warrington Academy down a peg or two, questioning both its influence and its curriculum. In terms of the number of ministers produced and the theology and ethics taught,
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the Dissenting academy at Daventry was actually “the more important for liberal Dissenters” (p. 136). M. A. Stewart shows that the philosopher Francis Hutcheson’s theological moderation owed as much to his experience with Irish Dissent as to his studies
at Glasgow. Martin Fitzpatrick argues that undue attention to its leaders, Richard Price
and Joseph Priestly, has obscured the diversity of thought within Rational Dissent and
overemphasized its reformist character (pp. 83–85). In separate essays John Seed and
Alan Saunders correct the caricature of Dissenters as fire-breathing revolutionaries by
underscoring their social conservatism (pp. 164–65, 241–42). Wilfrid Prest goes too
far, however, in trying to claim novelty for Priestley’s “emphasis on the law’s value as
a source of historical evidence” (p. 187); decades earlier, Robert Brady and Laurence
Echard, among others, had incorporated important legal evidence into their histories
of England.
For many contributors to this volume, the works of J. C. D. Clark (English Society,
1688–1832 [Cambridge, 1985]) and James E. Bradley (Religion, Revolution, and English Radicalism [Cambridge, 1990]) provide the major scholarly points of reference
for the politics of Dissent. Crudely put, Clark has emphasized the socially and politically unifying impact of an Anglican hegemony, while Bradley has instead stressed the
religious and political pluralism of English society. By demonstrating how the political
activism of a metropolitan coterie of Dissenters radiated into the provinces, Seed lends
some support to Bradley’s thesis. By documenting the success of Dissenters in pursuing
legal careers, Prest confirms Bradley’s point that some scholars have exaggerated the
effectiveness of penal legislation in excluding Dissenters from the professions. Several
essays seek to refine the theology found in Clark and Bradley. Saunders takes Bradley
to task for minimizing theological differences along the broad spectrum of Dissent (pp.
246–49), while John Gascoigne criticizes both Bradley and Clark for failing to appreciate the significance of the latitudinarian tradition on the Church of England’s liberal
wing (p. 221). A. M. C. Waterman’s essay offers the book’s most concerted theological
exposition of Rational Dissent. Taking up Clark’s suggestion that political radicalism
was a logical consequence of the Socinian heresy, Waterman posits that a denial of the
Holy Trinity and the Incarnation brought “the entire structure of establishment social
theory” (p. 216) crashing down. When Rational Dissenters attacked the Christian claim
that Jesus Christ served as mediator between God and man, they upset the principle of
subordination in both church and state, a concept traditionally expressed in terms of a
“head” having authority over the interdependent “members” of an intermingled ecclesiastical and civil “body.” Although Waterman admits that Socinians did not of necessity
come to hold democratic principles, his exegesis of orthodox Anglican ecclesiology
generally endorses Clark’s theoretical linkage of political and religious heterodoxy.
More significant than this book’s helping to fill out a scorecard on the Bradley-Clark
contest, however, is its commitment to theology. As the essays by R. K. Webb on rational piety, Alan Tapper on Priestley’s theodicy, and Iain McCalman on philosemitic millenarianism also make clear, if we are going to study the history of religion, then we
must obviously learn some theology. In this regard, Waterman’s technical mastery of
both orthodox and heretical theologies marks a high point in a volume that is not without a few low points. An intermittent lack of focus prevents the book from really hitting
its stride until chapter 5, while an incomplete index and an occasional failure to furnish
sufficient background may discourage neophytes. Some contributors have not kept up
with the literature, almost entirely neglecting, for example, Clark’s The Language of
Liberty, 1660–1832 (Cambridge, 1994), which in fact highlights the religious divisions
within English society. Moreover, this volume tends to assume a relationship between
Dissent and its other announced theme, the Enlightenment, rather than to explore that
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relationship explicitly. These reservations aside, Enlightenment and Religion powerfully enriches our understanding of its subject. Anyone interested in the varieties of
British religious experience or in eighteenth-century political culture will profit handsomely from reading this book.
Philip Hicks
Saint Mary’s College, Indiana
The Waning of “Old Corruption”: The Politics of Economical Reform in
Britain, 1779–1846. By Philip Harling.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. xii1307. $70.00.
Here is a book that deserves a wider readership than its $70.00 (predictably prohibitive
Clarendon) price will allow, for it is the most careful, scholarly, and disinterested look
to date at what William Cobbett famously and unforgettably called “Old Corruption.”
Corruption: “perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by
bribery or favor,” my dictionary says, and this is broadly what Cobbett meant. For him,
the term suggested a parasitic system—“The Thing,” he sometimes called it—that
taxed the wealth of the nation and diverted it into the undeserving pockets of a “narrow
political clique whose only claim to privileged status,” Harling explains, “was its proximity to the sources of patronage” (p. 1). More insidious and far-reaching than simple
favoritism, Old Corruption was “a unique political formation” (p. 1) that in the early
nineteenth century had a number of distinctive features, including sinecures, reverted
offices, undeserved or excessive pensions, places, and what Cobbett called “jobs”
(fraudulent government contracts). Its significance to the workings of eighteenth and
early nineteenth century politics has long been appreciated, but Harling’s is the first
systematic study of its extent and, more especially, its demise. The Waning of “Old
Corruption” is best read, I think, as a study in the making of the famously frugal,
relatively pure, mid-Victorian state.
Harling would have us read it more expansively as a study in the persistence of the
old regime. How was it, he asks, that England’s narrow landed elite managed to retain
its political power right through the Age of Revolution and on into the Victorian era?
If the economic flexibility of the English elite, together with its dexterity in shaping a
new ethic of respectability, accounts for its social resilience, what, Harling asks, accounts for its political resilience in an age of gathering democracy? His answer, in a
phrase, is economical reform. By removing the grievances that lay at the heart of the
Cobbettite challenge to oligarchy, by reducing and redistributing the tax burden, that
is, by eliminating sinecures and pensions, by purposefully dedicating itself to public
service rather than the defense of privilege, the Pittite elite was able to insulate itself
from charges of Old Corruption and sustain itself in power. What we have, then, is “a
ruling-class success story” (p. 2), one that focuses on the cleanup in government as an
explanation for the dissipation of radical energies after 1840.
This aspect of Harling’s book is, I think, a little overwrought and tends to obscure
the greater significance of social changes such as factory reform to the preservation of
(the old) order. But that “the politics of economical reform has not been given its due
in explanations of the transformation of the British state from the immensely expensive
military juggernaut of the late Georgian era . . . to the ‘cheap government’ of the midVictorian era” (p. 6), one can well believe, and this is where Harling’s book is most
valuable. He has traced the origins of the minimalist state into the 1780s, when Pitt
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and his followers began to champion frugality and honest stewardship not as ends in
themselves but as means of securing broader public confidence in government. Pitt’s
accomplishments as a fiscal reformer are well known, and Harling does not belabor
them. Instead, he links them usefully and originally to the declining fortunes after 1780
of the parliamentary reform movement. The case for reform had always rested on suspicions of ministerial extravagance, and Harling is thus able to show how a 30 percent
reduction in government spending between 1783 and 1792 had the effect of killing off
interest in constitutional change.
From 1793, of course, the vast expense of the French Wars slowed the pace of administrative reform and sullied Pitt’s reputation for disinterested management. The same
William Pitt who had been the hope of reformers in the 1780s was, by the time he died
in 1806, the widely despised architect of a nefarious “System” that had to be rooted
out. These transformations were largely matters of perception, and Harling is able convincingly to show that, even as the Cobbettite attack on Old Corruption reached its
height toward the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Pitt’s successors were working responsibly to eliminate it. Radical historians have relied heavily on John Wade’s sensationalist
Black Book of 1820 to affirm the notion of a regency state shot through with Old Corruption, but Harling actually scrutinizes the Black Book and finds it a tissue of tendentious allegations and “misleading inaccuracies” (p. 148). Old Corruption was less a
fact, he concludes, than a perception, a sort of “metaphor for a wide assortment of warrelated social, political, and economic changes that [popular radicals] presumed to be
detrimental to the people’s well being” (p. 150).
This point is unassailable, it seems to me, and suggests the need for a more culturalist
study of Old Corruption than Harling is disposed to offer. Having arrived midway
through his book at the recognition of Old Corruption as metaphor, he proceeds to
complete the story of its waning through a point-by-point history of administrative reform. Against those historians (W. D. Rubinstein chief among them) who have seen Old
Corruption growing fatter and fatter until 1832, only then to be dismantled by reformminded Whigs, Harling sees it growing leaner and leaner in the 1810s and 1820s, thanks
to the admittedly defensive efforts of Tory reformers motivated less by meritocratic
ideology than by a natural disposition to preserve their claim on power. It is an interesting and important, if ultimately unsurprising, finding. It adds a dimension of explanation to the persistence of the old regime and helps considerably to lengthen our perspective on the origins of the liberal, disinterested, let us say, Gladstonian, state.
Stewart A. Weaver
University of Rochester
Religion in the Age of Decline: Organisation and Experience in Industrial
Yorkshire, 1870–1920. By S. J. D. Green.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xv1426. $69.95.
Simon Green’s revisionist study of the decline of organized religion in three industrial
cities of West Yorkshire is a major contribution to the history of modern European
religion. Although unwilling to launch a frontal assault on secularization theory, Green
challenges two of its most important elements at the levels of causation and chronology.
Urbanization in his story is not a cause of religious decline, as in the classic theory of
secularization, but instead an opportunity for religious expansion. Furthermore, from a
late twentieth-century perspective, the decisive turning point in English religious his-
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tory is no longer the late eighteenth-century industrial revolution or the mid-nineteenthcentury crisis of faith but the institutional decline of the Protestant churches in the
decade preceding World War I. (A second wave of decline, beyond the scope of this
book and encompassing Roman Catholicism, occurred only in the 1960s.) Many scholars have called the theory of secularization into question. Green goes further and tells
a new story of early twentieth-century decline without reference to the hidden hand
of secularization.
In Green’s account, the history of nineteenth-century religion is a story of aggressive
institutional adaptation to a new religious situation. No longer taken for granted as
essential to the social order, the churches of urban Europe refashioned themselves as
voluntary institutions campaigning for both influence and members, with innovations
that encompassed unprecedented forms of piety and entirely new institutions. The success or failure of nineteenth-century urban churches was not a foregone conclusion but
depended on their organizational efficiency and their ability to negotiate the dangerous
shoals of social stratification and political polarization.
In three industrial cities of West Yorkshire—Halifax, Keighley, and Denholme—the
churches had achieved by the late nineteenth century a pervasive religious presence,
one strongly marked by social class but transcending class boundaries. Although a minority of the population were regular, Sunday-morning church attenders, a majority
were drawn into religious institutions for the traditional rites of passage and the Christmas and Easter services, or for urban innovations such as harvest festivals, Sunday
School anniversaries, New Year’s watch night services, church and chapel choirs, flower
services, and “fruit banquets.” Green is particularly good at explicating the decentralized finances of urban religious expansion. Wading through hundreds of financial accounts, minute books, parish and chapel histories, and biographies of clergymen and
ministers, he explains (among other things) the economics of the church bazaar and the
logic behind the displacement of pew rents by the weekly offertory envelopes. He provides the reader with a strong sense of place and an even stronger sense of the tenacious
commitment of late nineteenth-century men and women to their churches and chapels.
The most successful of the churches’ achievements was the Sunday School, which
drew all but the very poorest, and very wealthiest, of West Yorkshire urban children.
Green explains how Sunday Schools became popular, communal institutions, and how
they contributed in a wholly unanticipated way to the decline of the churches and the
subsequent decline of religious belief in the twentieth century. The Sunday School was
based on a new psychology of the relationship between adolescence and religion. Designed to provide a form of religion custom-tailored for the young, they inadvertently
propagated the notion that Sunday School attendance is the quintessential religious observance and that religion is only or especially for the young. By the early twentieth
century, Sunday scholars graduated, not to regular church attendance but to indifference, sending their own children off to Sunday School while sleeping in on Sunday.
Other internal bureaucratic changes contributed to the decline of the churches. A new
liturgical emphasis was especially noticeable in the Nonconformist churches, where
ministers stressed Sunday-morning church attendance, regular communion, and even
chanting in church, thus widening the gap between official religion and the popular
piety of the Harvest Festival and Sunday School anniversary. Green documents the ways
in which church leaders simultaneously became demoralized over falling church attendance and less interested in religious recruitment, concentrating on the “quality” of
religion among the shrinking remnant of churchgoers while ignoring the task of replenishing the church membership rolls.
Green’s focus on the inner working of church administration and debate has its costs,
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leaving him little time to concentrate on important external changes that made the
churches’ task more difficult. For example, he says little about the institutionalization
of state-funded primary education which, with its prominent religious component,
made the role of the churches more marginal. In West Yorkshire, as in Europe generally,
the churches fought hard for religious influence in education, politics, and later broadcasting. Time devoted to extending their influence over nonattenders was time taken
away from recruiting new members, an essential task of any voluntary organization.
Further, in his focus on the young, Green neglects the distinctive generation gap within
the Nonconformist chapels and only mentions in passing the heavily gendered character
of religious practice.
Green contributes to a growing body of scholarship in the social history of European
urban religion—by Mark Smith, Hugh McLeod, Callum Brown, Peter Van Rooden,
Hans Otte, Thomas Kselman and others—that calls into question any predictable link
between religious decline and urbanization. The implications of that argument for the
broad history of religion in modern Europe deserve careful attention. In general histories of twentieth-century Europe, the churches are barely mentioned except to note their
obsolescence. The decline of religion is attributed to the delayed but irresistible effects
of industrialization and urbanization or to the receding sea of faith in the nineteenth
century, which made religion less plausible. Green implies that the decline of orthodox
Christian religious belief in the twentieth century is a consequence, not a cause, of the
decline of the churches. Internal changes in the churches affected their ability to recruit.
Instead of ceasing to attend church because they ceased to believe, people ceased to
believe because they no longer attended church.
Jeffrey Cox
University of Iowa
Fertility, Class, and Gender in Britain, 1860–1940. By Simon Szreter. Cambridge
Studies in Population, Economy, and Society in Past Time, volume 27. Edited by
Peter Laslett, Roger Schofield, and E. A. Wrigley.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xix1704. $74.95.
Simon Szreter’s monumental work builds on a Cambridge Ph.D. dissertation completed
in 1984, but we learn from the acknowledgments that the seeds were sown much earlier
by Peter Laslett. The result is an arguably overlong but nearly always stimulating treatise in intellectual, social, and demographic history. In effect Szreter offers two books
in one. The first is a critical history of earlier interpretations of the decline in marital
fertility in England and Wales and of the thinking that influenced the General Registration Office for England and Wales (pts. II and III). The second offers Szreter’s own
model of that fertility decline and a test of it with 1911 census data (pts. III and IV).
Throughout Szreter’s target is what the dust-jacket blurb dubs the “national, unitary,
class-differential model of fertility decline.” He submits this “professional” model to a
cross-sectional test with data from the 1911 census of England and Wales, which included a special section on marital fertility. The outcome is a rejection of the story of
gradation from professional to working-class, blue-collar couples. It turns out that there
is considerable variation across occupations within broad aggregated classes (class 1–
class 5) and several anomalous patterns. By the same token Szreter dismisses the famous Princeton model of convergence through modernization as well as the traditional
emphasis on the primacy of a shifting cultural norm toward the small family type.
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Szreter promises a “general” approach applicable to “a variety of historical and even
contemporary contexts” (p. 5).
How does Szreter account for the anomalies left unexplained by the professional
model? For him the driving mechanism behind fertility decline was not cultural change
but a rise in what he calls “the perceived relative costs of childbearing” from the final
decades of the nineteenth century on (p. 445). This may sound like just another way of
describing the cost of children as measured by followers of economist Gary Becker.
However, there are very few pounds, shillings, and pence in this work, and Szreter
deems economic considerations secondary, referring to the “rich range of meanings”
for “perceived relative costs” (p. 445). He stresses the impact of institutional factors
such as trade unions, factory legislation, compulsory schooling for children, and the
earning power of women—as if these were outside the realm of economic calculation.
True, the impact of such factors is not easy to measure, but it is not impossible. Qualitatively, Szreter is quite persuasive, but this reader is left with the sense of a rich, implicitly economic model, not rigorously tested.
The main quantitative focus, both in the rejection of the “professional model” and
the test of Szreter’s proposed alternative formulation, is on the range of fertility variation found in the census of England and Wales for 1911. Focusing on the fertility of
unions involving twenty- to twenty-four-year-old brides who married between 1881 and
1885 reveals a huge variation, ranging from an average of 3.2 children for barristers
and men of means to 6.6 for bricklayers and 7.5 for coal miners. Unionized workers
with dependent wives (e.g., in mining areas) had lots of children; lower-paid workers
who were not unionized and had economically active working wives (e.g., in cotton
textile districts) had fewer children.
The database is subject to a number of limitations. First, focusing mainly on the
cross-sectional riches offered by the 1911 census means that the time-series dimension
cannot be adequately covered. Second, the aggregated data as presented make it difficult to separate out the effects of geography and economics. Third, the census concentrates on the averages for each occupational category, but it also matters a lot how much
variation was within occupational categories and what accounts for such variation.
Though the discussion notes the importance of factors such as geography, religion, education, and the urban/rural divide, their quantitative impact is not measured. Householdlevel data like those available to researchers in Irish or U.S. demographic history would
be a help.
Szreter offers a judicious critique of earlier survey evidence in arguing that attempted
abstinence was the most widely used method of birth control before 1914, with artificial
contraceptives becoming increasingly important after then, and abortions still relatively
few in the 1930s. He also marshals a compelling case for the importance of “spacing”
as distinct from “stopping” as a birth-control strategy. Traditional interpretations of the
fertility decline were parity-specific, and the Princeton model stresses the strategy of
stopping at some target number of children. However, the 1911 census contains strong
evidence for the alternative scenario of couples spacing the target number of births over
the fertility span. Such an interpretation was argued by Stanford economic historian
Paul David for the United States and for Ireland in the 1980s; here Szreter presents the
case for England and Wales, largely on the basis of other evidence. As he notes, family
planning activist Marie Stopes was an enthusiastic proponent of “spacing,” and the
letters to her from hundreds of correspondents in the 1910s and later sought information
on precisely this point.
Despite the promise in the title, Szreter does not offer the reader much about trends
in Scotland. Nor is he precise on how his model might be translated to other settings
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or on how the relative power of the factors listed above in different settings might be
measured. One senses that the model was built to fit the data, rather than the data analyzed to test a ready-made, generally applicable model. Had it been the other way
around, he might have adopted a less insular and more comparative stance. But, such
reservations aside, one leaves this long book respectful of its clever arguments and
illustrations and convinced of the need to consult it often in the future.
´
´
Cormac O Grada
University College, Dublin
`
´
Vivre en prison au XVIIIe siecle: Lettres de Pantaleon Gougis vigneron
`
ˆ
chartrain (1758–1762). By Benoıt Garnot. La France au fil des siecles. Edited by
Françoise Hildesheimer and Odile Krakovitch.
Paris: Publisud, 1994. Pp. 239. Fr 228.
ˆ
´
Thanks to Benoıt Garnot, we can now add Pantaleon Gougis to the select company of
crafty commoners in premodern Europe whose stories are illuminating the humble face
of the past. Like his sixteenth-century predecessors, the Friulian miller Menocchio
(C. Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms [Baltimore, 1980]) and the Gascon peasantturned-soldier Arnaud du Tilh (N. Z. Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre [Cambridge
1983]), Gougis, a peasant from Chartres, ran afoul of the authorities in mid-eighteenthcentury France. Accused of arson in 1758, when he was thirty-nine years old, Gougis
ˆ
spent four years in the Conciergerie prison in Paris, followed by a brief stint at Bicetre
before his release in 1762. Garnot’s slim volume brings these events to life through the
eyes of a resilient peasant who, despite the loss of his fortune, maintained his faith that
justice would ultimately be served.
Garnot’s book consists of three sections. The introduction establishes the historical
context of the documents, making them accessible to a nonspecialist audience. This
opening is followed by a chronologically arranged series of forty-four letters written
while Gougis was a prisoner at the Conciergerie from 1758 to 1762. Garnot has reproduced the letters but has corrected spelling and punctuation absent from the originals.
Thus, his text conveys the flavor of Gougis’s style while removing the barriers that might
deter a modern reader. Gougis’s letters are followed by a brief correspondence between
two notaries, the Chartrain Leroy and the Parisian Dahault, who dedicated themselves
ˆ
to securing Gougis’s release from Bicetre. Finally, Garnot includes relevant financial
documents, family charts, and a glossary of eighteenth-century judicial terms.
Gougis came from a family of peasant farmers who lived in the faubourg Saint-Jean
situated just outside the walls of the medieval cathedral town of Chartres. The evidence
suggests that Gougis was a comfortable peasant who owned his own land, hired men
to work his fields, and even kept a domestic servant. Like many eighteenth-century
cultivators, Gougis diversified his crops, planting a combination of cereals on the majority of his land while reserving a small amount of soil for grapes. In 1740, at age
twenty, Gougis married Marie-Catherine Courtois, the daughter of a neighboring peasant family. Obliged to marry young because Marie-Catherine was pregnant, relations
between the two quickly soured. Although they produced four more children, the two
spouses spent many of the ensuing eighteen years apart. In August of 1758, the couple
filed for a separation. While the courts were reviewing the case, Gougis was accused
of setting fire to his sister-in-law’s house in late September of 1758. Thus, Gougis was
simultaneously defending himself against two charges, one of which, arson, carried a
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severe penalty. Moreover, the two disputes were linked because the same witnesses
testified against him on both counts. In 1759, while Gougis was still in the Conciergerie
for the arson charges, the court finalized the separation settlement, granting his wife
custody of the five children and forcing Gougis to sell all of his belongings to pay
his wife.
Gougis’s letters evoke a broad spectrum of Old Regime life ranging from the peasant
village and its internecine conflicts to the corridors of the Parlement of Paris and the
antechambers of secretaries of state. At the same time, Gougis’s correspondence offers
a glimpse into the fascinating underworld of the Old Regime prison and the individuals
who provided for its inhabitants. The majority of Gougis’s letters were written to his
one powerful friend in Chartres, the notary Monsieur Leroy. Gougis was continually
giving instructions about managing his land and his ongoing legal battles, gleaning
information from the criminal law manuals he was diligently reading in prison. The
letters oscillate wildly in tone, capturing the anxiety that was an inevitable product of
prolonged incarceration, lack of outside information, and a dwindling sense of control.
Gougis was by turns confident (p. 66), desperate (p. 82), resigned (p. 133), and angry
(p. 111).
This book would make a wonderful classroom text if translated because it conveys
the mental world of an early modern French peasant in his own words. Such sources
remain all too rare. Moreover, it highlights the complicated workings of Old Regime
justice as well as Gougis’s faith in this system and his ability to operate successfully
within it. Two minor criticisms should be mentioned before concluding. First, there is
a confusing discrepancy between the notes and their numbers in the text. Second, it
would have been useful to include the notes at the bottom of the page rather than at the
end since the constant flipping back and forth interrupts the flow of the reading. These
´
are small complaints, for the fact remains that nobody who meets Pantaleon Gougis
will easily forget him. The documents Garnot has so painstakingly gathered allow for
an encounter with the past that is both vivid and moving.
Lisa Jane Graham
Haverford
The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation, and the Self in
Modern Culture. By Jerrold Seigel.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995. Pp. viii1291. $34.95.
Duchamp: A Biography. By Calvin Tomkins.
New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1996. Pp. 550. $35.00.
Biography haunts art history with an intensity and persistence that is unique among the
humanities and social sciences. As Donald Preziosi has put it, the art historian-critic (for
these two roles are, in practice, conflated) is imagined as a “tracer of lost person(a)s, . . .
a forensic detective,” whose job is to “remove . . . the opaque roof from the labyrinthine
chambers of the artistic mind.” 1 The art historian-critic attempts to excavate the “artistic
mind” through a complex logic of interpretation: the art object is understood to be a
transparent purveyor of artistic intentionality and personality; by analyzing its formal
1
Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science (New Haven, Conn., and
London, 1989), p. 23.
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structure, the art historian is seen as uniquely able to reveal its “original” meaning as
putatively expressed by the artist at creation and return it to its proper place in the
teleological flow of images and objects that is the history of art.
Art history is thus obsessed with the individual artist; it involves, primarily, “the
production of an artistic subject for works of art.” 2 What are the stakes behind such a
production? The more exalted the artistic subject, the more (literal) economic value
accrues to the work of art within the art market. Unlike any other field involved in the
study of Western culture, art history is linked to a thriving commodity system: there is
a direct correlation between the value ascribed to individual artist-names (as supposedly
translated directly via the work of art to the trained observer) and the value assigned to
the unique (or pseudo-unique, in the case of photography and other replicative media)
objects they have produced. Ultimately, the value assigned to these objects and, correlatively, to their authors/origins reflects back onto the art historian himself. At the most
basic ideological level, the stakes of the biographically invested practice of art history
involve the very authority of both art history as a disciplinary practice and the art
historian-critic as its practitioner.
That said, I must insert myself here and make clear that I do not consider it possible,
nor desirable at this point, to attempt to disinvest ourselves from the biographical axis
of the study of visual culture. We are too entranced by the texture of individual subjectivity, a texture that seems to enhance the very surfaces and depths of the objects before
us: it is the romance of intersubjective connectedness that the arts in general offer us
and that motivates our ongoing production and reception of culture. What use or interest
would paintings, novels, or ready-mades be to us without the enticing promise of fulfilled desire that they endlessly proffer? (And, there is no desire without other subjects,
however these might be construed.)
It is at this point that a figure such as Marcel Duchamp enters—or, rather, bursts—
into the situation. For, it is precisely Duchamp who, beginning just before the First
World War, most dramatically assisted in the explosive disruption of the assumptions
of biographically oriented engagements with visual art. And yet, paradoxically, it is also
precisely Duchamp who (along with Pablo Picasso and Jackson Pollock) has been the
most important biographical fetish in the history of twentieth-century Western art and
who has, in the last twenty years, emerged as the obsessively reiterated trope (usually
biographically accessed) of contemporary art or postmodernism tout court.
`
Given the above analysis, which lays bare my ambivalent position vis-a-vis art historical uses of biography, I am in the somewhat difficult position of reviewing two
books—Jerrold Seigel’s The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp and Calvin Tomkins’s
Duchamp: A Biography—which specifically revolve around or (in the case of the Tomkins book) are situated specifically as the artistic biography of Marcel Duchamp. My
difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that I myself have written a book (Postmodernism
and the En-Gendering of Marcel Duchamp [Cambridge, 1994]) that attempts to interrogate the premises of biographically oriented histories of art, in particular the way in
which Duchamp has been obsessively positioned by art historians-critics as an originary
figure—contradictorily, even as the inventor of postmodernism’s critique of unique authorship. I am thus bound to have, at best, an equivocal if not highly critical relationship
to Tomkins’s and Seigel’s texts.
The two books at hand both assume biography to be essential to the comprehension
of not only artistic objects but modern history in the broadest sense. At the same time,
2
Griselda Pollock, “Artists Mythologies and Media Genius, Madness and Art History,” Screen 21,
no. 3 (1980): 57–96, quote on 58.
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both disdain engaging with issues raised in discussions of postmodernism, which puts
them at a distinct disadvantage, since most of the work on Duchamp in the last twenty
years has indeed examined his oeuvre from this point of view. Seigel exposes his own
ignorance and his anxiety about recent debates about Duchamp’s role in visual culture
by, at the very end of the book, writing disparagingly of postmodernism, which he
places in scare quotes and identifies with the litany of “feminism, gay liberation, and
multiculturalism” (p. 249). Given the importance of these latter models not only to
rethinking the epochal importance of Duchamp’s work but also to exploring the meaning of visual culture today, it seems a shame at this point to produce yet another rendition of Duchamp’s works (as translations of his life, and vice versa) within a framework
of historical understanding that eliminates contemporary concerns.
Seigel proclaims right away in his preface, “I have sought to make Duchamp accessible to those who know little or nothing about him” (p. vii). Thus, Seigel’s reading
assumes an access to meaning in a way that, in my view, goes completely against the
grain of how Duchamp’s works have come to mean in recent discussions, where the
ready-mades are compellingly viewed as having completely unhinged the modernist
conception of the art work as having a unique and fixed value and the complex, playfully
open-ended figure of Duchamp is seen as confusing modernism’s desire for coherent,
originary subjects of intentionality.3 My language points to my resistance to the notion
that this radical interrogation of meaning and subjectivity is inherent: to Duchamp’s
objects and self-performances; such a claim would contradict my point that there is no
“correct” meaning embedded in them. Rather, I see Duchamp’s oeuvre (including his
self-presentation, his production of himself as an artistic subject) as engaging in specific, recognizable, social discourses and offering the possibility of opening up the determination of meaning and value as a process of exchange among artists, objects, and
interpreters.
Seigel attempts to cover his bases right at the beginning by letting us know that he
is “not trained in art history,” arguing that his perspective “as a student of modern
culture more generally is appropriate to a figure whose relationship to painting was
usually distant and ambiguous” (p. 15). Although I would certainly agree that a cultural
historian has much to bring to the study of this broad-ranging artist, it is also clear that
all of Duchamp’s thinking was done in relation to, if obviously not in agreement with,
the Western painting tradition. For this reason, Seigel’s lack of art historical background
cannot absolve him from familiarizing himself with the myriad discussions of Duchamp’s position in the history of art that have been generated from within the discipline
of art history-criticism in the last twenty years.
Because it does not address the masses of recent material that have been published,
Seigel’s book offers very little to the art historical audience that would surely have
otherwise comprised his primary readership. Also, because of its apparent lack of familiarity with these modes in which Duchamp has been extensively discussed, Seigel’s
´
analyses are superficial and, at times, even cliched. He describes the ready-mades, for
example, as having “mounted their challenge from outside the recognized sphere of
artistic practice; their novelty,” he argues, “consisted precisely in breaching the boundary between art and non-art” (p. 115). Seigel is writing here about a set of objects that
have been discussed through thousands, probably millions of pages—in texts by auˆ
3
Thierry de Duve, Resonances du readymade: Duchamp entre avant-garde et tradition (Nımes,
1989), and Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from Painting to the Readymade
(Minneapolis, 1991). See also my Postmodernism and the En-Gendering of Marcel Duchamp (Cambridge and New York, 1994).
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thors as diverse as Thierry de Duve (a Belgian art historian well known in the United
¨
States), Peter Burger (a German theorist of the avant-garde, also known in the United
States), and David Joselit (a younger-generation U.S. art historian-critic).4 It is simply
not enough at this point to reiterate the most obvious and, even so, contested aspects of
the ready-mades.
In spite of his distance from the discipline of art history, Seigel, in a move typical in
this discipline, takes for granted the idea that the author’s intentions, first of all, were
transparent and untroubled in their first expression by the artist and, second of all, are
now easily discernible by the sensitive reader (i.e., himself) via a combined reading of
the forms of the works of art and the extensive interviews and texts that Duchamp
himself supplied. These latter, by the way, are texts that Seigel himself admits are equivocal at best and deeply confusing or abstruse at worst; and yet Seigel is still determined
to provide “accessible,” finalized meanings for the texts and the works they seem to
define or obscure, and, most problematically, “to show that his career forms a coherent
whole” (p. 12). Duchamp’s works are seen as having “defined Duchamp as a person
and an artist,” and they “fit together like the pieces of a puzzle” (pp. 12–13).
While this locution might seem to be a twist on the typical art historical model,
where the artist (as his identity is interpreted) is superimposed onto the works as their
explanation, I would argue that it is actually born of the exact same logic: the works
define Duchamp the person (they are claimed to “mirror his mind’s contents” [p. 85]);
but the “person” Duchamp is continually invoked to give meaning to the works throughout (“[b]ehind the continuity of these themes in Duchamp’s work there stood some
persistent and recognizable features of his personality” [p. 97]). The book is not short
on psychobiography and the “puzzle” at hand here emerges as a realist image of “Duchamp,” whatever or whomever that might be (the elusiveness of this project of definitively fixing “Duchamp” is evident in the contradictions that rupture the realist facade
at every point).
´
Still, as he himself hopes, Seigel’s book may indeed provide a useful entree for nonart historians into Duchamp’s life and work (if not, unfortunately, into the complex field
of Duchamp studies, as this research is hardly discussed). While I have, myself, been
too immersed in this field to read Seigel other than critically, I appreciate the broader
armature that he attempts to bring to his examination of Duchamp’s life and work. For
example, in the chapter “Motions and Mysteries,” Seigel offers a useful contextualization of Duchamp’s 1912 “virgin” and “bride” paintings via a reading of Raymond Roussel’s Impressions d’Afrique. But often even this important attempt at a broader intellectual contextualization of Duchamp’s work gets caught up in its own contradictory logic.
In the chapter “Subjective Spaces,” where Seigel explores Duchamp’s early paintings
of his family, for instance, he attempts to explain their apparent ambivalence via what
he identifies as the tension Duchamp himself supposedly experienced between wanting
to “escape into himself” and wanting to separate art from “individual self-expression”
(p. 42); he then extends this tension into nineteenth-century modernism through rather
superficial readings of paintings by Manet and Caillebotte in terms of the split between
public and private. Although this raises some interesting questions, the tautological
logic of reading Duchamp’s ambivalence through his paintings and writings and then
turning it back on these images/texts as an explanation for their ambivalence undermines Seigel’s own desire to propose this context as definitive.
¨
Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis, 1984); David Joselit, “Marcel Duchamp’s Monte Carlo Bond Machine,” October 59 (Winter 1992): 9–26. See also de Duve (n. 3
above).
4
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As an academic historian, Seigel lacks the journalistic flair of Calvin Tomkins, who
knows how to reduce one of the most complex and nonconventional creative lives of
this century to a readable story. Yet Tomkins, too, weakens the punch of this excellent
tale by reiterating Seigel’s distaste for new discussions that place Duchamp in relation
to political, sexual, and other broader social concerns. In dismissively noting “the increasing tendency among younger artists to deal with the ‘issues’ (as they like to call
them) of gender, sexuality, and the human body in their work” (p. 461), Tomkins reveals
that the true threat here is the very exposure of erotic desire—the interestedness of
interpretation that the discourse of feminism, in particular, has sought to expose. This
eroticism (interestedness) lies at the root of all interpretation but, as feminism points
out, is veiled in the psychobiographical study of art history, which poses as “objective”
rather than acknowledging its implication in this circuit of desire. The threat of, especially, the feminine seduction (of the text) is also inadvertently exposed in many of
Tomkins’s obviously interested descriptions of the women in Duchamp’s life, which
verge on misogyny (do we need to know that, in Tomkins’s view, Lydie SarazinLevassor, Duchamp’s first wife, was “extremely fat” and “never understood” anything
about the brief relationship and its breakup [pp. 277, 283]? or that Peggy Guggenheim
was, in Tomkins’s estimation, “gauche, insecure, overbearing, and ravenously promiscuous,” as well as being “ugly . . . with her dyed black hair, bulbous nose, blotchy skin,
´
and smeared lipstick” [pp. 315, 341]? or that Gala Dalı was a “voracious man-eater
who had left the poet Paul Eluard because she sensed that she could get more mileage
´
out of Dalı’s genius” [p. 293]?). Among other questions we could ask of these singularly
harsh evaluations (the reader is hard put to find any similar descriptions of men), the
most obvious would be: where is the “objective” evidence for such claims?
I find myself tempted to posit an inherent meaning to Duchamp’s works here to support my own readings (which are overtly invested in the “issues,” as I like to call them,
of “gender, sexuality, and the human body”); these are readings that would see Duchamp’s sixty-year span of work as, precisely, insisting on the implication of gender,
sexuality, and the human body (not to mention the “issue” of economics) in the production and reception of works of art. These are readings that would take issue with such
naturalized, and insulting, descriptions of women which contrast so strongly with Tomkins’s sympathetic descriptions of men. But I won’t posit such meanings, for I do believe
they are motivated by my own particular investments.
In spite of this rather unpleasant moment at the end of Duchamp: A Biography, in
the hands of Tomkins, the artist’s life generally becomes a compelling narrative of impressive complexity. If anyone could write a successful biography of Duchamp, it is
Tomkins, who interviewed the artist in the late 1950s for Newsweek and has dwelled
on his legacy over almost forty years of entertaining essays on the contemporary art
scene in the New Yorker and other venues. Tomkins makes a real effort not to reduce
Duchamp’s biography to a simplistic, and finished, tale of a singular persona and he
largely succeeds even if he does, obviously, stick very close to the traditional biography format.
Ironically, though, given his own apparent aversion to “issues” of sexuality and politics, Tomkins is at his best when narrating Duchamp’s sexual and political alliances (or
lack thereof), his “emotional deadness” and inadequate response to World War I as well
as his “callous behavior” toward important women in his life, such as Mary Reynolds
(pp. 208, 258). In spite of my suspicion toward psychobiography, I continually found
myself drawn into Tomkins’s usually even-handed accounts of Duchamp’s complete
lack of political and sexual responsibility. Tomkins is deeply enamored and respectful
of Duchamp but doesn’t spare us from some of his more unsavory traits (though, out of
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my own bias, which parallels Tomkins’s, I still found it impossible to see Duchamp in
an antagonistic light). In reading this book I was forced to confront my own desire to
“know” (and to love) Duchamp.
All in all, the Tomkins book is an extraordinary achievement and a stellar addition
to the field of Duchamp studies—though the question of how this biographical narrative
can be usefully mobilized in art historical research and writing will continue to remain
open. One is constantly overwhelmed by the wealth of information, much of it previously unpublished, that is casually and pleasurably recounted in this lengthy account.
As a historian, I found myself wishing only that Tomkins were less resistant to other
views, more open to new research approaches in relation to Duchamp, and more clear
about some of his sources. The book is not footnoted, and only direct quotes are attributed in the back; as an unfortunate result of this trade book format, there are numerous
times when specific (and dramatically new) information is given with no indication of
the source. While I have no reason to doubt Tomkins, I would want to know where he
obtained such information as Katherine Dreier, Duchamp’s friend and patron, was
flawed by a “nasty strain of anti-Semitism” (p. 380) and Duchamp felt a “natural sympathy for the women’s suffrage movement” in 1915 (p. 153), and so on.
One wishes, finally, that Tomkins had restrained his desire to belittle “Duchampian
idolaters” (p. 351), especially since he could certainly be counted among us. Both
Seigel and Tomkins weaken otherwise interesting accounts of this major artist through
their anxious attempts to diminish the work of other, especially younger scholars invested in “issues” that go beyond the biographical details of Duchamp’s individual life
(as if these could be singularly staged and retrieved, or separable from the social dimension of Duchamp’s practice, then and now).
It is clear that Duchamp’s works still have much to teach us. It is my view that the
most interesting lesson that might be had from the ready-mades has strategically been
overlooked by zealous explainers who want answers from Duchamp’s oeuvre. The
ready-mades highlight the tautological logic by which art historical accounts give works
of art value by associating them with an author-name, pointing to the way in which
such a circuit of meaning-attribution is a closed one. That is, the ready-mades, which
are initially objects with no value other than use value (a bottle rack, a snow shovel, a
urinal) are turned into objects with aesthetic value (by definition having no use value
whatsoever) through the very act of authorial nomination and signing. It is the act of
authorial identification and (as I interpret Duchamp’s oeuvre as suggesting) the way in
which aesthetic, political, or economic value are assigned, which together initiate the
circuit of meaning production.
This circuit, as the ready-mades suggest, is dramatically conditioned by the participation of the interpreter (art historian, critic, historian), whose own projected desires,
assumptions, and fantasies position the work culturally and historically. As Duchamp
stated in his important lecture “The Creative Act” (1957): “In the last analysis, the artist
may shout from all the rooftops that he is a genius; he will have to wait for the verdict
of the spectator in order that his declarations take a social value and that, finally, posterity includes him in the primers of Art History. . . . All in all, the creative act is not
performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work in contact with the external
world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution to the creative act” (Tomkins, p. 510).
Duchamp has plainly drawn the attentions of posterity. Rather than relying unquestioningly on the biographical armature of conventional modes of art historical analysis
in order to assign definitive meanings to his life and work, however, one wishes that
those who choose to delve into the Duchampian oeuvre at this point would be equally
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suspicious about assigning meaning through a search for artistic intentionality and
would engage in the existing, very lively and contentious debates that, as Duchamp
seems to have suggested in his lecture, surely condition the way in which his life and
work have come to mean.
Amelia Jones
University of California, Riverside
´
Jean Monnet, 1888–1979. By Eric Roussel.
`
Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1996. Pp.1004. Fr. 198.
The former British Prime Minister Edward Heath described Jean Monnet as the man
who made things happen; the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Michel Rasquin, said
that he enlarged the possible. Many have described him as ranking among the dozen
most influential statesmen of the twentieth century. He therefore deserves a biography.
´
Since he himself published his Memoires some twenty years ago, in a volume of some
642 pages, it is natural that any biographer who is going to consider
´ his life in its
fullness should ask his readers to accept an even longer volume. And Eric Roussel, who
is already the author of a work on Georges Pompidou, more than justifies the length of
his volume by carrying out an amazing amount of research and consulting the public
archives of the United States and of the relevant European countries, as well as the
private papers of most of the statesmen with whom Monnet was concerned (the notable
exceptions being Churchill and de Gaulle).
Roussel begins his work with a description of Monnet in his retirement, at the age of
eighty-eight, living in his thatched house in the small commune of Bazoches-surGuyonne, in the Ile-de-France. All the villagers know Jean Monnet by sight, because
early every morning he sets off for one of his walks across the woods and fields. Few
of them know anything about him, although there are rumors that he once was important. There is, in contrast, one other famous person who comes intermittently to stay in
the village, a certain Brigitte Bardot. She is well known to the villagers. But it is the
elderly man with the battered hat and walking stick that, on February 2, 1977, a host of
distinguished visitors comes to see. They are from several European countries. They
present him with a document. The governments of the European Community and the
European Council have made him an honorary citizen´ of Europe.
The honor is unique, but Jean Monnet is unique. Eric Roussel leads us through the
story of his life and we can see that his achievement was not merely that of having had
the concept of Europe and making it a reality. He played a remarkable role from the
day in September 1914 when he saw the French Prime Minister Viviani and was then
sent by him to meet the minister for war, Millerand, to May 9, 1975, when his Action
Committee for the United States of Europe was dissolved and he announced his retirement.
Monnet was the son of a brandy producer in Cognac and was there born to a reasonably comfortable living. Brandy was a great stimulant for him, but to sell and not to
drink. Soon he was traveling widely. In Egypt, he caught a pulmonary infection that
prevented him from being called up in 1914. But in Canada he developed a connection
with the Hudson Bay Company, whose products he made available for French government purchasing. Then, through his meeting with Viviani, whom he greatly impressed
as a man of energy and determination, he was able to arrange for the French and British
allies to cooperate in their acquisition of material for the prosecution of the war. That
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Allies should work together rather than compete was a simple idea. It was one of the
simple ideas that Monnet was to follow throughout his career. He always said that what
he set out to do was to follow the dictums of common sense.
Also, even in this early period, Monnet became known as a contact man, and as such
his usefulness, to put it mildly, became essential. This was acknowledged by the newly
born League of Nations when it appointed him to be its deputy secretary general in
1919. Monnet, then thirty years old, stayed in the post for only four years, but his taste
for the corridors of power became insatiable. During the interwar years, he worked as
an international banker and as an ally of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but his ability for
being in the right place at the right time was confirmed by his presence in London
during the dark days of 1940, as chairman of the Franco-British Coordination Commit´
tee, concerned, as in 1914, with the purchase of materiel. It is here that Roussel’s book
becomes essential reading.
It was on February 23, 1943, that Monnet left Washington, D.C., where he had been
living since the summer of 1940, for Algiers. Theoretically he went there at the request
of General Giraud, de Gaulle’s rival for power in French North Africa. This request had
come via a certain Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who is described as “an adventurer” by
Roussel and as “a fascist” by the British Foreign Office. But the real instigator of Monnet’s journey was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who saw him as his personal representative.
Under cover of a technical appointment, Monnet was to advise General Giraud, who
was known to be lacking in political acumen, and to seek every means of strengthening
his military power. In this way, de Gaulle would be frustrated in his attempts to establish
himself in Algiers. Recounting the complicated maneuvers that followed, Roussel has
amassed a typically impressive documentation. He has used the memoir Monnet wrote
in the 1970s, recounting his mission, and in particular we should note his use of the
Robert Murphy papers and the papers of Colonel de Limares, Giraud’s chef de cabinet,
as well as the testimony of his son.
Monnet was himself suspicious of de Gaulle, believing that he had dictatorial rather
than democratic intentions. But his chief contact with Giraud was through Colonel de
Limares, who supported de Gaulle, admiring in him “the soul” of the French resistance.
´
Giraud was loyal to his superior, Petain, and in favor of Vichy’s National Revolution. In
the middle of this imbroglio was General Catroux, a well-respected figure who could
lay claim to being something of an independent Gaullist.
This story ends with the triumph of de Gaulle. The Americans, especially Robert
Murphy, accused Monnet of being a traitor. De Gaulle dismissed Monnet contemptuously as “that little financier” who was in the pay of Great Britain, while other Gaullists
(Couve de Murville is quoted) considered him to be an American agent. Giraud simply
recalled, with wry amusement, that Monnet had caused him to make the only democratic speech of his life.
Monnet was at times irritated, and even angry, but we are shown the real figure of
the man. He was always at work. The small apartment in the rue Michelet did not recognize Sundays or public holidays, as one of Monnet’s team regretfully recalled. Monnet
wrote unceasingly, letters and memoranda, often at great length (and quoted in extenso
by Roussel). There were meetings, telephone calls, conversations that became administrative or political gestures. And all the time there is the man who is dependent on his
wife and family and who is waiting for their letters. But we do not get very close to
that Monnet, other than to record his existence. The real Monnet, as presented here,
quickly erased his irritation at de Gaulle’s success and Giraud’s failure and settled down
at his work, continuing to strengthen the government and the army. The real Monnet
was the man who lifted his eyes from the harassments of Algiers and reflected on what
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should happen after the war. From April 1943, he considered the future of Europe and
especially the future of two states, France and Germany.
Roussel does not write dramatically. It is not his style to present to the reader the
picture of a middle-aged man, in the summer of 1943, marking out the steel-and-coalproducing areas of the Ruhr and Lorraine and explaining to a friend that they must be
taken away from France and Germany. He reproduces the memorandum that Monnet
wrote on that occasion. Nor is he critical of Monnet, since one can ask if he really
understood de Gaulle. In this respect, Roussel differs from his predecessor as biograˆ
pher, François Duchene (Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence [New
York, 1994]). Nor does he explore how, in his negotiations, he would sometimes say
opposing things to different people (as shown in Serge Bernstein, ed., Le M.R.P. et la
´
construction europeenne [Paris, 1993], which is not in the bibliography). But this work
of great scholarship shows us the persistence, the concentration on the essential and´the
endless capacity for bold negotiation that made Monnet important. For this work, Eric
Roussel was awarded the Guizot Prize for History in 1996.
Douglas Johnson
University College of London
Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy. By
Silvana Patriarca. Cambridge Studies in Italian History and Culture. Edited by
Giorgio Chittolini et al.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii1280. $49.95.
Silvana Patriarca’s Numbers and Nationhood is an important contribution to a dynamic
and growing literature on the history of European statistical writings in the modern
period. Patriarca’s study examines the role played by statisticians in producing an image
of the Italian nation from the years immediately following the Napoleonic Wars up
through the first decade of national unification in the 1870s. Patriarca’s sensitive and
wide-ranging analysis concentrates on “the place that statistics occupied in the formation of a liberal and nationalist outlook, and . . . on the contributions [statistics] gave to
the very imagining and shaping of a national space” (p. 5). The story she tells does not
neglect the important influences of British, French, and German statistical theories on
Italian social scientists, but Patriarca rightly emphasizes the particularity of the Italian
context, which is not without its own ironies. The universal dreams of an objective and
statistical social science, she argues, did much to create a convincing and legitimized
image of a unified nation among Italian elites between the 1820s and the 1860s. After
unification, however, this same allegedly universal statistical method gave scientific
credence to an alternative political idea: the powerful myth of “two Italies,” which has
done so much to separate the nation into a wealthy region in the north and an economically impoverished region in the south.
One might have expected Italian statisticians to show a closer affinity to the German
and Austrian tradition of Staatenkunde or Statistik, if only because of the close involvement of the Hapsburgs in the affairs of Lombardy and Venetia in the late eighteenth
century. Patriarca argues, however, that the Napoleonic tradition of descriptive statistics
had a much more marked influence on early nineteenth-century statistical researchers
in Italy. Former officeholders from the Napoleonic regimes preserved the administrative
procedures of this new governmental science, eventually producing a wide body of
statistical work on cities, communes, provinces, and states between the 1820s and the
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1850s. Two figures stand out in Patriarca’s analysis as essential reference points: Melchiorre Gioia (1767–1829) and Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761–1835). Both men
emerged from Milan’s lively intellectual community during the revolutionary decade of
the 1790s, and their careers ran roughly parallel, embodying two strands of the Enlightenment tradition as it was carried into the nineteenth century. Gioia, an enthusiastic
´
Benthamite and a follower of the French ideologues, was a passionate quantifier and
author of an early plan for a statistical study of the Italian Kingdom in 1808, the Tavole
statistiche ossia norme per descrivere, calcolare, classificare tutti gli oggetti d’amministrazione privata e pubblica (statistical tables or norms for describing, calculating, and
classifying all the objects of private and public administration [Milan, 1808]). Gioia’s
materialist empiricism, and his enthusiasm for counting, was counterbalanced by Romagnosi’s more philosophical predilections. If Gioia provided Italian statisticians with
a practical model of the indefatigable researcher, Romagnosi gave their work a theoretical legitimacy. His philosophy of incivilimento established statistical research as a necessary part of a wise government in a society devoted to economic and political development with no impediments to free trade. The generation that followed Gioia and
Romagnosi, including such figures as the Venetian Adriano Balbi (1782–1848) and the
˚
¨
Swede Jakob Graberg till Hemso (1776–1847), established important and lasting connections between research in political economy and geography in Italy, linking the
study of land, the environment, and civil society in ways that would have important
repercussions in the political realm.
Works such as these, argues Patriarca, were marked by certain common methodological and epistemological concerns reflecting the attitudes of a liberal and bourgeois
intellectual community during a period of aristocratic reaction. The proponents of statistical research on population and economic activity criticized the official administrations of the Italian states for not making their accounts public. Like their counterparts
in northern Europe, these writers saw statistics through the filter of a kind of anatomical
realism, whereby their quantitative work would lay bare the sinews of the “social body,”
making clear its organizing principles and establishing the proper diagnosis of its “pathologies” (pp. 61 ff). Patriarca’s book is especially enlightening in these sections, in
which she examines the different conceptions of the state that emerged in the decades
before national unification as well as the various models of selecting and presenting
statistical data that accompanied these political programs. Arguing that these works
were intrinsically pedagogical in their function, Patriarca’s discussion concentrates on
“the powerful rhetoric of the ‘natural’” that accompanied these works, a rhetoric that
“visualized for the reader the necessary relations linking different parts of reality to
each other, . . . [making] immediately apparent a hierarchy of things and a scheme of
causality” (p. 64).
In the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, a tradition of “patriotic statistics” developed on the
Italian peninsula, aimed both at countering the negative stereotypes of Italian culture
that were common elsewhere in Europe and at the lingering conservatism of traditional
elites at home. As Patriarca writes, “the statistical descriptions of Italy produced before
unification were an overt rhetorical weapon in the hands of Italian reformers and patriots: by responding to the ‘false’ images produced by foreign observers and to the ‘useless’ representations of antiquarians, they aimed at establishing Italy’s ‘true picture,’”
constituting “a precise political statement about the legitimacy and viability of the future nation” (p. 125). Typical of these works was Luigi Serristori’s Statistica dell’Italia
(Florence, 1835–39) which covered not only each of the Italian states but also areas
belonging to other countries that geographers considered to be a part of the peninsula.
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Serristori (1793–1857), who had studied mathematics at the University of Pisa, developed a set of quantitative indicators to measure the material prosperity and “degree of
civilization” attained by each of the Italian regions. Chief among these indicators was
population density, which Serristori believed to be a key element in the development of
commerce, communications, and a high degree of culture.
As Patriarca’s book convincingly demonstrates, it was precisely these kinds of quantitative comparisons, dressed up in the guise of “moral statistics” and later Lombroso’s
“criminal anthropology,” that did so much to undermine the political unity established
during the 1860s. As Darwinian ideas of biological determinism, evolution, and racial
typology were imported into Italy, statistics were soon used to recast the differences
between the inhabitants of the various Italian regions, inscribing the divisions between
north and south or urban and rural in a newly rationalized hierarchy of progress and
backwardness. No longer universalizing in its intent, the statistical “rhetoric of the natural” soon attached itself to quite different political agendas, which would have been
unrecognizable to Enlightenment figures such as Gioia or Romagnosi. The great virtue
of Patriarca’s work is thus to illustrate the variety of ideological positions that oriented
themselves around statistical portraits of the Italian nation in the nineteenth century,
remaining ever attentive to the complexity of that elusive nexus between knowledge
and power in the modern world.
Joshua Cole
University of Georgia
Erasmus of the Low Countries. By James D. Tracy.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996. Pp. ix1297.
In his foreword, James Tracy wonders whether two books on Erasmus by one scholar
are not enough, but the reader of this easily readable third one will welcome its publication as it is not a rehash of previous work. Tracy introduces much recent scholarship
and does so unobtrusively even where his insights diverge from other treatments. In
many instances, this biography rounds out the portrait of Erasmus.
There are other benefits as well. While one may not pick up a study of Erasmus to
learn about the complicated political and social situation in the Low Countries, the first
chapter is a fine thumbnail sketch of post-Burgundian developments. Tracy correctly
suggests (p. 3) that, without an understanding of these, the student of Erasmus is likely
to miss the full meaning of his vision of the “spiritual commonwealth of believers” and
of the many currents of religious thought from which he distilled that vision. And in
his chapter on Erasmus and his readers, Tracy usefully relates the importance of the
“prince of humanists” for the beginning of the Polish Reformation through the work of
Jan (II) Laski (Johannes a Lasco) and others.
Not the least benefit lies in the organization of the material that is presented in three
parts: “Bonae Literae: The Making of a Low Country Humanist, 1469–1511”; “Philosophia Christi: Erasmus and the Reform of Doctrina, 1511–1522”; and “Second
Thoughts, 1521–1536.” Tracy justifies this division in his introduction. Each of the three
parts is also preceded by a brief guide to the topic announced. While one may quibble
with so strict a chronological approach, Tracy overcomes its possible problems by refreshing the reader’s memory whenever he discusses the deepening of Erasmus’s mind
or when he examines the “second thoughts” of his later life. Incidentally, the chronolog-
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ical approach makes this biography into a useful companion volume to Erasmus’s correspondence that is edited, for example, in the splendid English translations in Collected
Works of Erasmus (ed. James K. McConica et al. [Toronto, 1974–]), which are in the
process of publication.
As could be expected from the author of an earlier study on the mind of Erasmus,
the strength of Tracy’s new biography lies in the exposition of Erasmus’s major writings.
From these he makes a judicious selection for a closer examination (in which he follows
the example set by Erasmus in his own educational essays). He explains their salient
points in the manner of a comfortable teacher in a “friendly and familiar” rather than
“contentious” speech (p. 29) and he works “bits of” the writings “into the flow of his
language” (p. 37). One could only wish that there would have been more space for a
more extensive treatment (for which that of the Praise of Folly is a good example) of
other works as well. And I regret that the essay on repairing the unity of the church
(1533) is only mentioned in passing.
Because sixteenth-century studies are dominated by the religious reformations, Erasmus’s Philosophia Christi has received so much attention that contributing something
new poses a real challenge. But here too most readers are well served by Tracy’s succinct treatment of Erasmus’s insistence on being guided by the words of Christ. He
places Erasmus in the long tradition of safeguarding the doctrina of the church; he also
sets him off against such others as the earlier Lorenzo Valla, his contemporary and
collaborator Juan Luis Vives, and the later John Calvin. Tracy uses Calvin to discuss a
road not taken by Erasmus. Here it would have been useful for a general reader also to
have had Erasmus set off against the official teachings of the church as defined by the
Council of Trent. In the council’s final sessions, its theologians were so absorbed by
their defense of orthodoxy against the Protestants that the road Erasmus had mapped
out was not taken by the defenders of the church he had refused to leave.
I first learned about Erasmus from Jan Romein and Annie Romein’s Erflaters van
onze beschaving (Testators of our civilization) (The Hague, 1940). The Romeins pay
much attention to Erasmus’s emotional disposition. He was self-centered and, I would
say, almost pathetically so. Tracy avoids speculations about this aspect of Erasmus’s life.
But I would have liked to read, for example, Tracy’s considered evaluation of Erasmus’s
disavowal of such early influences on his development as that of Cornelius Gerard
(Aurelius) or of his failure to intervene with Henry VIII in 1533 on behalf of his friend
Thomas More. From the safety of Freiburg in Germany he might well have afforded
this act of loyalty, the more so as he then no longer needed to rely on the largesse of
patrons. Self-centeredness also comes out in Erasmus’s perception of his mission, already outlined in his Antibarbari, as a restorer of the Christian Republic for which he
worked so zealously once he had made a name. In pursuit of this mission he tolerated
little criticism, and that not simply because some of this criticism resulted in accusations of heresy. Fear of such accusations, as much as his desire to preserve the peace
he thought necessary for the success of his mission, caused him to look for the dissimulating and even ambiguous formula, which—as Tracy points out—was one reason why
his influence waned in the heat of the Protestant-Roman polemics. Erasmus’s intolerance stands in contrast to his own disdain for the theologians he chastised for their selfesteem in his De contemptu mundi.
On Erasmus and Philip Melanchthon, I would have made use of Heinz Scheible’s
“Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus” (in A. Buck, Renaissance-Reformation:
¨
Gegensatze und Gemeinsamkeiten [Wiesbaden, 1984], pp. 155–80). I looked in vain
for a discussion of Erasmus’s sharp attack on the Pseudo-Evangelicals (1529) in Ger-
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many, who then included a fellow Dutch humanist, Gerard Geldenhouwer (Noviomagus). Erasmus had no second thoughts when it came to reformers whose expansions on
his own work endangered his mission as he saw it.
But these desiderata for satisfying my curiosity hardly reduce the value of this very
helpful introduction to an important figure in the history of Western civilization.
Derk Visser
Ursinus College
Das preußische Gymnasium in Staat und Gesellschaft. Volume 1: Die Entstehung
des Gymnasiums als Schule des Staates und der Gebildeten, 1787–1817.
¨
Volume 2: Hohere Bildung zwischen Reform und Reaktion, 1817–1859. By
Karl-Ernst Jeismann. Industrielle Welt, volumes 15 and 56. Edited by
Reinhart Koselleck and M. Rainer Lepsius.
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996. Pp. 475; Pp. 797. DM 258.
These two weighty volumes, of which the first is a revision of a book originally published in 1974, will finally replace the work of Friedrich Paulsen from the late nineteenth century as the indispensable starting point for an understanding of Prussian secondary education in the era between Frederick the Great and Otto von Bismarck.
Although Paulsen’s study ranged more broadly over other German states, Karl-Ernst
Jeismann’s thorough research in Prussian state and regional archives and his skillful use
of recent scholarship in educational history give his work greater insight and balance
than Paulsen’s had.
Jeisman defines the “Prussian Gymnasium” of his title more narrowly than might
appear at first glance. He distinguishes it clearly from the Latin schools (Gelehrtenschulen) of earlier centuries, using the introduction in 1787 of the first Prussian regulations
for a secondary school diploma, or Abitur, as the point of departure for his study. More
unusual is his distinction between these new schools of the early nineteenth century
and the “humanistic gymnasium” that emerged after 1859, the year that Prussia introduced “first-class Realschulen” (later, Realgymnasien) of equivalent length and rigor to
the classical schools. In Jeismann’s view, from the 1810s through the 1850s, the Prussian gymnasium served as “the municipal secondary school,” offering education for
almost all boys interested in going beyond the elementary level (2:21). Thereafter, it
became one of several competing schools and focused more closely on pupils intending
to graduate and less on those who stayed only a few years.
Although Jeismann’s portrayal of the Prussian gymnasium as “the municipal secondary school” suggests the triumph of the plans for a single form of secondary education
put forward by Wilhelm von Humboldt and his associates in the Prussian reform era,
the main thrust of the first volume is actually a partial debunking of these reformers.
Without denying the importance of the introduction of certification for secondary teachers in 1810 and the revised Abitur regulations of 1812, which were accompanied by
the first recommended curriculum, Jeismann argues that Humboldt and his immediate
successors “only continued the reform initiatives of the two decades before 1806, although at an accelerated pace” (1:233). Of particular value in this regard is Jeismann’s
investigation of the plans and initiatives, generally neglected by other scholars, made
under the leadership of Julius von Massow between 1798 and 1806, the era when neutral Prussia stood aside from the Napoleonic Wars.
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Jeismann also stresses the difficulties of implementing the decrees of the reform era,
examining in particular the struggles after the wars to introduce the gymnasium curriculum and Abitur in the newly acquired provinces of the Rhineland and Westphalia. He
notes as well that only thirty-nine secondary teachers had taken the certification examinations as of 1815 and thus that the “real creation of the profession of secondary teaching does not fall in the reform era, but is a work of the restoration” (1:341).
The second volume extends this upward revaluation of the restoration era, with Jeismann expressing “amazement” at “how energetically” officials pursued implementation
of the reforms (2:42). He attributes the continuity in policy in large measure to the long
term of Karl von Altenstein as the Prussian Minister of Religion and Education from
1817 to 1840 and the even longer tenure—from 1818 until 1859—of Johannes Schulze
as the official in charge of secondary schools. Despite the increased bureaucratization
and curricular rigidity that emerged in this era, Jeismann finds the overall trend in secondary schooling to have been improvement, not retreat.
Among the numerous themes that Jeismann examines in the second volume are foreign educators’ views of the Prussian gymnasium, the fate of the politically suspect
gymnastics movement in the schools, the gradual emergence of Realschulen designed
for boys not interested in university studies, the growth of pedagogical training for
secondary teachers, a major controversy in the 1830s about the overburdening of pupils,
and the development in the 1840s of attacks on the “pagan” gymnasium by Christian
conservatives. This reviewer found particularly interesting Jeismann’s discussion of the
controversial topic of the “Catholic educational deficit,” the underrepresentation of
Catholics in Prussian secondary and higher education compared to their proportion of
the overall population. Noting that, “for Catholics in the western provinces there were
more ‘reachable’ Gymnasien than for Protestants in the eastern provinces” (2:404), he
argues vigorously that “Prussian educational policy is not one of the reasons” for the
Catholic deficit (2:412). He does not, however, discuss how priestly celibacy, in contrast
to the fecundity of most Protestant pastors, contributed to this deficit.
The revolutions of 1848–49 produced numerous initiatives toward educational reform, but as with so much else in that era, they generally came to naught. Yet as with
the restoration after 1815, Jeismann finds the 1850s less reactionary than they have
often been portrayed: “In the context of the sharp attacks on the Gymnasium of the
Altenstein era,” he writes, “the reform of 1856 appears quite remarkable,” bringing only
modest changes in the gymnasium’s curriculum (2:607). More important, in his view,
was the introduction of the first-class Realschule in 1859 as an equivalent, if not yet
equal, type of secondary school. Even in this move to satisfy demands for a more modern form of education, though, Jeismann finds little influence of an emerging “economic
liberalism,” much more of the Prussian educational administration (2:623).
Apart from its length and cost, Jeismann’s work invites serious criticism in just one
area: its unclear contribution to a significant controversy about Prussian secondary education in the nineteenth century. In a major book published in 1977 (Sozialstruktur und
¨
Schulsystem: Aspekte zum Strukturwandel des Schulwesens im 19. Jahrhundert [Got¨
tingen]), Detlef Muller argued that what Jeismann calls “the Prussian Gymnasium” had
served as a “comprehensive school” (Gesamtschule), meeting the needs of the majority
¨
of pupils who did not graduate as well as the majority who did. According to Muller, the
trend after 1859 toward what Jeismann calls the “humanistic Gymnasium” amounted to
a socially defensive measure on the part of the educated classes who wanted to preserve
their privileged status for their sons while pushing boys from the economic middle class
¨
into other schools. On the surface, Jeismann appears to agree with Muller; he certainly
emphasizes how recent scholarship has rediscovered the large numbers of early leavers
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from the Prussian gymnasium. Yet he insists that what he calls “the municipal second¨
ary school” was not a “comprehensive school” in the sense meant by Muller, without
adequately clarifying what the key differences were (2:151).
James C. Albisetti
University of Kentucky
Verwaltet und verwahrt: Armenpolitik und Arme in Augsburg: Vom Ende der
¨
reichstadtischen Zeit bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg. By Susanne F. Eser. Historische
Forschungen, volume 20. Edited by Karl Erich and Harald Zimmermann.
Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke, 1996. Pp. 384. DM 98.
The history of poverty and poor relief in modern Europe has been enjoying something
of a renaissance. German scholars have been among those revisiting the topic, with
arguably the most impressive result to date being Christoph Sachsse and Florian Tenn¨
stedt’s Geschichte der Armenfursorge in Deutschland. Despite innovations, however,
historians have tended to follow the pattern of German national historiography by focusing primarily on welfare policy in Prussia and the Reich. As Susanne Eser points out
in her study of nineteenth-century poor relief in Augsburg, this not only marginalizes
developments in southern Germany, which deviated significantly from those in Prussia,
it also fails to take into account the signal importance of municipal administration,
which has almost single-handedly run German poor relief since the Middle Ages. Eser’s
well-researched social and administrative history of poverty in one Bavarian city between 1781 and 1914 thus offers the means to assess empirically the conclusions of
more general studies.
Eser begins her investigation at an unconventional point—with the laws of residency
(Heimatrecht) in Augsburg. But it is the coupling of residency requirements with regulations about poor relief that, in her view, distinguished southern from northern German
welfare in the nineteenth century. In the medieval tradition of distinguishing between
residential and alien beggars, poor relief in modern Augsburg persisted in linking entitlement to benefits with proving one’s historical membership in the local community.
This policy proved increasingly difficult to sustain as Bavaria liberalized laws on citizenship and migration in the 1810s and 1860s. This led city officials to embark on a
“sealing-off policy” designed to award residency to only those with sufficient capital
¨
or property. Augsburg’s restrictive Auslanderpolitik was therefore conceived as a prophylactic Armenpolitik.
Eser then goes on to examine in detail the social world of Augsburg’s poor relief.
What she describes is a welfare administration much the same as that elsewhere in
Germany. Run on an honorific basis by local notables and financed mostly through the
voluntary contributions of the bourgeoisie, welfare in Augsburg was a thoroughly local
affair from 1816 onward. Yet, as demand for services grew and poor administration
consistently ran deficits, bourgeois officials increasingly turned to stricter supervision
over beneficiaries, emphasized services over compensation, and recruited the assistance
of private charities to supplement public aid. The result was a welfare administration
characterized by the very same processes Sachsse and Tennstedt have identified as most
formative throughout Germany in the nineteenth century: secularization, municipalization, rationalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization.
Poor relief itself was divided into four branches of service: outdoor relief, residential
care, employment, and child care (the last is not discussed by Eser). Outdoor relief
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consisted mostly in establishing soup kitchens and distributing wood to the needy during winters. Both institutions, of only nominal importance before 1848, grew in prominence over the century as authorities placed ever greater emphasis on services rather
than cash benefits. Residential care was provided for only the most destitute and decrepit, mostly by hospitals and the poor house. In practice, this meant that the municipal
poorhouse served mostly as a supervised repository for the chronically poor and ill.
With the creation of a separate facility for the homeless in 1884, the poorhouse took on
the character of a nursing home and was later renamed the Municipal Home for the
Elderly in 1920. Finally, all persons receiving outdoor relief and any poorhouse resident
deemed fit were compelled to work. Bourgeois authorities perceived unemployment as
a moral failing on the part of the poor and therefore embraced compulsory labor less
as an economic than as a pedagogical solution. Women in particular “benefited” from
the program, often employed as seamstresses on a putting-out basis. Nevertheless, the
income that both the poor and the poorhouse received did little to make either party
solvent. For most welfare recipients, compulsory labor proved to be the last station,
rather than the beginning, of their working lives.
Eser’s most interesting findings may well lie in her analysis of the reported causes of
poverty in nineteenth-century Augsburg and the effectiveness of public policy. Records
reveal that poverty disproportionately afflicted single people, families with numerous
or sickly children, and the elderly. The most consistent reason for seeking aid throughout the century was therefore the dissolution of or lack of ties with an intact household.
As they have been since the Middle Ages, women—particularly widows—were overrepresented among all these groups, thus comprising around 70 to 80 percent of Augsburg’s welfare recipients.
Eser’s assessment of public policy’s impact on its charges is generally critical. Augsburg’s strict marriage laws, its disdain for monetary compensation, its moralistic embrace of compulsory labor, and its turn-of-the-century retrenchment policies tended to
simply reinforce recidivism among those most vulnerable to poverty. The emergence
of social insurance in the 1880s did provide a real measure of social security to many
working poor and went some way in alleviating municipal welfare’s health care burden.
Nonetheless, since social insurance covered only certain, mostly skilled, workers (and
then, only for certain periods of time), there were numerous gaps in coverage. Poor
relief was thus de facto called on to fill in these gaps. Social insurance therefore had
its greatest impact by institutionalizing the distinction between the honor of work and
insurance on one hand and the stigma of poverty and welfare on the other.
In the end, Eser succeeds in providing a “thick description” of municipal welfare in
nineteenth-century Germany. Her findings on the reported causes of poverty, relations
between social service branches, and the links between migration policy and poor relief
offer solid data for comparison. While her results tend to support the conclusions of
Sachsse and Tennstedt, however, this owes much to the fact that she assumes their categories as her standard of evaluation. More attention to a wider, less German-centered
literature—as she does, for instance, when she sporadically invokes Pierre Bourdieu’s
work—would have given her the means to appraise the state of German welfare historiography more effectively.
Greg A. Eghigian
University of Texas at Arlington
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Languages of Labor and Gender: Female Factory Work in Germany,
1850–1914. By Kathleen Canning.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii1343. $42.50.
In this highly ambitious and thoroughly researched monograph, Kathleen Canning sets
out to challenge both the methodological commitments and substantive findings of the
main current in recent German labor history. For a variety of complex historical reasons,
much recent labor history in Germany has remained fixed within the boundaries of a
modernization model that privileges class formation and formal labor organizations.
Although fully aware of critiques of this current within Germany and the proliferation
of “postmodernist” attacks on class analysis, Canning positions herself as an outsider in
relation to mainstream German labor history. She contests its basic tenets by deploying
feminist and poststructuralist concepts and categories to explore the multiple meanings
assigned to women’s labor in the textile industry of imperial Germany. Although Canning acknowledges that the textile industry was not representative of German industrial
transformation, she justifies her research not only because it was an important industry
with a largely female labor force but also because it served as a crucial laboratory for
state officials and social reformers alarmed about the relations between industrialization
and the fate of the working-class family, motherhood, and sexual morality.
Canning’s analysis is divided into three parts. In the early chapters, she discusses the
gendered aspects of the transition from a household economy to a factory system in
German textile regions. She carefully differentiates between patterns of feminization
and the conflicts that resulted through four case studies in the Lower Rhineland and
Westfalia. In the two cases in which gender-exclusive alternative employments were
available, she finds that displaced male handweavers did not oppose female factory
employment, although where no such alternatives existed, male weavers strongly resisted feminization. In the latter cases, male weavers revived a language of craft and
reinvented guilds to halt mechanization and female employment. These weavers’ constructions of their plight shaped the positions of social reformers in the 1880s and led
to calls to ban women from factory work. Canning is unable to determine, however,
whether these regional patterns affected long-term work identities of female laborers.
In the second part, Canning subtly analyzes a wide array of contemporary social
inquiries and policy literature to present a detailed and nuanced study of the genesis
and development of public discourses about female factory labor in imperial Germany
and the controversies and reform initiatives that ensued. The key agents are reformers
from the educated professional middle class, including feminists, factory inspectors,
and other officials, as well as Catholic social thinkers and Social Democrats. Divergences and convergences among their positions are painstakingly delineated. Absent,
however, is any systematic probing of the discourses of political economy and the role
business leaders played in these debates, despite their manifest power to impede reform.
Canning distinguishes between three periods of discourse formation and policy prescription between the mid-nineteenth century and 1914, each with its own distinct physiognomy. She especially focuses on the two periods after Kaiser Wilhelm II’s announcement of a “New Course” in social policy in 1890 when political participation and the
public sphere substantially expanded, socialists and feminists became active, women’s
factory labor became grudgingly accepted, and issues of hygiene were recast in eugenic
terms of counteracting the declining birthrate and strengthening female bodies for empire. Canning highlights the ways women workers became defined in labor legislation
as needing protection to fulfill their marital and maternal roles in contrast to male
“breadwinners” and citizens who could articulate their own interests.
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The third part takes up the work identities and experiences of women textile workers.
By undertaking a statistical analysis of factory records, Canning is able to dispel the
common prejudice that women textile workers lacked long-term commitments to their
work and is able to show that women’s work was erroneously characterized as unskilled
to maintain low wages and gender hierarchies. Because of fragmentary sources and
interpretive problems, however, her treatment of other aspects of identity is less satisfactory. She uses the famous Crimmitschau textile strike of 1903 in which familial
issues and women workers figured prominently to assert that female textile workers
sought to dissolve the dichotomy between home and work. This appears to be an overstatement. Renegotiating a boundary does not eliminate it. Moreover, although growing
numbers of women textile workers were married, the single childless young female
workers, who were the majority, virtually disappear. Canning’s evidence on women’s
opposition to factory sponsored dormitories and day care centers is limited or contradictory (pp. 302–3, 306–8) and many of her accounts of sexuality derive from problematic
reports by middle-class observers. It is also difficult to tell from this section whether
the discourses and legislation so carefully analyzed earlier mattered much to the identities of women textile workers.
Despite its dialogue with poststructuralism, Canning’s book is a palimpsest of recent
approaches to labor history. It shuttles between older structural analysis, an emphasis
on agency and subjectivity characteristic of the E. P. Thompson school and its German
offshoot Alltagsgeschichte, and poststructuralist textuality. In principle, there can be
few objections to such theoretical and methodological eclecticism. The applications of
these approaches, however, often seem arbitrary and inconsistent. A structural analysis
of women workers who joined textile unions by type of production, region, and length
of employment might have provided a more precise explanation of union membership.
The writings of middle-class women reformers Maria Bernays and Minna WettsteinAdelt, who were briefly employed in textile factories, cried out for discursive analysis
to ascertain the degree to which their observations were prefigured by earlier texts about
the sexuality of women workers. A more systematic account of the structured coercive
hierarchies in which women workers were embedded within the factory regime, the
family, and even by other workers might have led to a more critical evaluation of the
romantic concept Eigensinn, the “creative reappropriation of the conditions of daily
life” (p. 13). Canning ultimately hesitates to follow postmodernist logic of abandoning
master narratives and deconstructing “class” to its disintegrative conclusion. Despite
their different regional and religious backgrounds, occupational specialties and familial
situations, Canning’s women textile workers approximate a collective subject, rather
than merely wraithlike discursive objects. Canning asks serious questions about the
relation of women textile workers and gender constructions to the rhetoric of “class,”
class formation, and state labor policy. She certainly makes a major contribution to
unpacking the complex and contested meanings of women’s factory labor in imperial
Germany. It is doubtful, however, that this rich work can successfully resist assimilation
within a more gender-aware developmental model.
Derek S. Linton
Hobart and William Smith Colleges
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Verbraucherprotest und Parteiensystem im wilhelminischen Deutschland. By
¨
Christoph Nonn. Beitrage zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen
Parteien, volume 107.
¨
Dusseldorf: Droste, 1996. Pp. 363. DM 70.
In this thoroughly researched, cleverly illustrated, and informative book, Christoph
Nonn proposes to fill one gap in our knowledge of the German Kaiserreich on the eve
of World War I: the role of the increase in food prices for the growing crisis of the Old
Regime. At the same time that he explores the mobilization of the urban masses—
women, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, both skilled and unskilled—he
traces the effects of the price increases on party politics and the attempts to force parliamentarization. The growing opposition between urban consumers and agricultural producers in the decade before World War I acted as a rehearsal for the politics of shortage
and dissatisfaction that culminated in the revolutionary situation of 1917–18.
Nonn singles out the increasing prices of meat as most disturbing for the urban population. During the two decades preceding the turn of the century, the lower classes enjoyed an increasingly diversified diet. As meat and milk were added to the staples of
bread and potatoes, workers and others came to regard them as necessary not only for
their higher nutritional value but as evidence of an increasingly dignified lifestyle.
When price increases for animal products forced families either to buy less meat or to
reduce expenditures for other household necessities, the result was anger and dissatisfaction with specific policies and with the prevailing system. While Nonn exaggerates
when he contends that price increases in the decade before World War I represented a
trend, he argues convincingly that the steep rise in meat prices in 1906, 1910, and 1912
affected party politics significantly.
The Social Democratic Party exploited consumer dissatisfaction with rising food
prices to call attention to its long-standing opposition to the militaristic policies of the
Kaiserreich and to the Prussian three-class suffrage. Nonn demonstrates that the party
was most successful in arousing popular interest in these measures when it combined
protest against them with agitation against tariffs and taxes that contributed to higher
prices. At the same time, the party’s emphasis on lower grain tariffs and the expanded
import of meat so alienated the agricultural population that the party was forced to
abandon its recruitment of small farmers and agricultural day laborers. Instead it shifted
its propaganda toward the urban white-collar consumer, particularly lower government
officials. This new direction reinforced reformist tendencies within the party, accelerated its transformation from a workers’ to a people’s party, and led to compromises with
bourgeois groups. As these compromises occurred, the possibility of a reformist bloc,
representing a crisis for the Old Regime, emerged.
On the other side of the coin, consumer dissatisfaction led the bourgeois parties—the
Center, the National Liberals, and the Left Liberals—to devise strategies that bolstered
reformist tendencies. Because members and voters for all these parties resided in both
town and country after 1900, party strength and unity were threatened by the growing
opposition between urban consumer and rural producer. If the middle parties supported
grain tariffs and meat import quotas, they were at the mercy of Social Democratic appeals to consumer dissatisfaction in the cities. When they appeased the consumer by
favoring the cheaper import of foodstuffs, the aggressive propaganda of the Agrarian
League drew away the votes of small and part-time farmers. In some regions, those who
represented the opposing sides could no longer meet together in the same room.
In an attempt to retain both urban and rural voters, the middle parties increasingly
adopted positions designed to satisfy both sides: tariffs and meat import quotas for the
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countryside; the reduction of taxes on consumption, higher salaries, and social subsidies
for the urban population. In order to achieve these aims, they had to combat the entrenched Conservatives. Hence they increasingly favored Prussian suffrage reform and
parliamentarization. To the extent that these measures dovetailed with Social Democratic goals, an alliance of the middle with the left, such as occurred in the Reichstag
elections of 1912, was possible. When rural opposition to this compact caused them to
retreat to the smaller alliance of the middle, the bourgeois parties nevertheless continued to press for reforms that the Social Democrats supported.
Nonn has contributed a new dimension to our understanding of Imperial Germany:
the significance of consumer dissatisfaction in creating the pressures for a reform of
the Old Regime. Last, he demonstrates that the Agrarian League’s mobilization of the
rural masses against consumer interests exacerbated those pressures. Although the governmental elite was prepared to adopt policies to placate the consumer, the attitude of
Conservative rural producers hardened and prevented compromise. As the opposition
between urban consumers and rural producers intensified during World War I, the economic and political dissatisfaction combined to produce crisis and revolution. Nonn’s
thesis should inform not only the student of German history but all those interested in
the interplay between economic and political factors in a consumer society.
Beverly Heckart
Central Washington University
¨
Dorfgemeinschaft und Parteipolitik, 1918–1933: Die Verschrankung von Milieu
und Parteien in den protestantischen Landgebieten Deutschlands in der
¨
Weimarer Republik. By Wolfram Pyta. Beitrage zur Geschichte des
Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, volume 106.
¨
Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1996. Pp. 514. DM 118.
The failure of the Weimar Republic at the national level has been the subject of repeated
investigation. But Weimar also collapsed, perhaps more significantly, at the provincial
level. It was not just in the urbanized regions and at the centers of political life that the
party politics of parliamentary democracy broke down. It lost its following in political
elections and popular opinion at the local level, in villages with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants—in rural Germany, according to the statistics. The loss occurred primarily among
the Protestant agricultural population, where (as in the universities) the Nazi Party
(NSDAP) was able to mobilize voters quickly and intensively. This electoral support
among the rural evangelical populace gave the National Socialists a base from which
to penetrate urban areas. The Catholic countryside, however, still belonged to the Catholic social milieu after 1919. Even during the political turmoil of the extended 1932
campaigns, rural Catholic voters remained within the fold of the Center Party.
The effect of National Socialism on the rural areas was a kind of political homogenization. This effect is especially surprising because up until 1919—in some areas until
1928—rural evangelical voters had cast their votes for an extremely diverse spectrum
of political candidates. Liberals, conservatives, even anti-Semites had fared well.
Though we do have studies of agricultural interest groups, the social unit of the village
has been less well examined. Until recently it belonged more to sociology than to history. Studies of the history of politics, of society, and of organizations during the Weimar period tended to emphasize prominent historical actors in the metropolitan areas:
industrial workers, the old and the new middle class, and, most recently, the Catholic
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subculture. Regional histories, though they have increased significantly in number, have
concentrated primarily on areas in the western part of the empire and so have not been
in a position to offer careful analyses of the social and political character of the rural
evangelical communities, which lay predominantly north and east of the Elbe. The prevailing view of Weimar society as an industrial one has served to screen out certain
subjects as less worthy of historical investigation. As a result, the geographically uneven
pace of modernization, industrialization, democratization, secularization, and so on has
been all too easily forgotten. We still know far too little about the political attitudes and
dispositions of modernization’s laggards in the countryside, the human reservoir whose
anxieties National Socialism was able to exploit successfully in its quest for votes. The
Cologne historian Wolfram Pyta’s habilitation thesis presents a wealth of observations
and succeeds in awakening a renewed, deepened historical interest in the failure of the
political and cultural project known as the “Weimar Republic” in the rural evangelical
communities.
In order to explain the shift to National Socialism, Pyta has investigated the nexus
of village and politics in the rural evangelical communities. Significant conceptual presuppositions are involved in this choice. The focus of his study is not socioeconomic
interests. Nor is it social inequalities among the rural evangelical populace. Nor is it
regional differences, though Pyta does clearly establish the distinction between manorial ownership and landlord ownership. He does not believe that the various dispositions
of social and economic interests or the processes of class formation contribute much to
explaining the success of National Socialism in the countryside, although this is the
approach favored in social history. Rather, he emphasizes the autonomy of local politics
and the web of local relationships. Methodologically, he attempts to construct politicalsocial typologies in order to analyze the mechanisms through which public opinion in
the villages was formed.
At the center of his investigation stands the village community (Dorfgemeinschaft),
“a non-instrumental, not excessively codified, compact social entity, owing its origin to
the intensive social contacts among a limited number of people living similar patterns
of life within a small area, and consciously accepted by its members as a social unit”
(p. 42). Pyta’s approach begins as it were from the bottom up, with “relationships” in
the village. His framework is not that of society, nor that of the social-historical position
of the village in the Weimar Republic, but rather the integral unit as it existed on the
spot. Pyta does not put forward any regional-historical claim to have found, in one
particular region, an exemplary model to illustrate how National Socialism penetrated
local society. Rather Pyta constructs his typologies in order to reach general conclusions. By emphasizing the concepts employed at the level of the “community,” as opposed to the analytical framework of “society,” Pyta invites some attendant difficulties.
The concept of community employed in this study cannot always shed the signs of its
origin in contemporary self-understandings. Since “class” and “strata” are not terms
available for Pyta to use in characterizing the social groups as they formed in the village, he resorts instead to the broader self-characterizations of “social standing” (Stand )
and status formation (Standesbildung). Had he begun at the level of society (Gesellschaft), Pyta might have been able to analyze in a more critical way the contemporary
self-descriptions and self-understandings and get beyond them.
The landowner, or the manorial lord in a manorial community, the pastor, and the
schoolteacher regulated political processes in the countryside. The basis for the authority of these shapers of village opinion, their social prestige, derived from their socialeconomic, ecclesiastical, and cultural positions. At the same time, they represented
points of contact between the regionalism of the village and the supraregional structures
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and ideas in politics and culture. Not only did they contribute to the economic, religious, and cultural self-preservation of the village; they also mediated between the internal and the external, exercised political influence, issued election recommendations,
and promoted particular clubs and organizations. They mediated between the space
of the village community, on the one hand, and the political realm, on the other. Less
well clarified in this study is the situation of the rural artisans, an important segment
among the independent populace: the numerous smiths, barrel-makers, cabinet-makers,
saddle-makers, coach-makers, food processors, and rural grocers.
In several steps, Pyta examines models for the formation and dissolution of village
communities in order to make clear the attractiveness of the National Socialist political
platform to the village elites. What emerges as characteristic for the political culture of
the rural evangelical communities in the Weimar period is the fact that landowners,
farmers, pastors, and schoolteachers, each in their own way, made a kind of transition
from the idea of a village community (Dorfgemeinschaft) to that of the racial community (Volksgemeinschaft). Ideologically, National Socialism succeeded in overcoming
the traditional manner in which the rural community insulated itself from everything
foreign.
Pyta describes in detail the key National Socialist motif of the racial community and
its idealized national images of farmers, large landowners, pastors, and schoolteachers.
First he discusses the many immanent, and apparently insoluble, village conflicts, and
then he reviews the platform of each political party in turn with respect to its potential
attractiveness. At the beginning of the Weimar period, the traditional localism and political indifference of the rural populace had grown. After the agrarian crisis of 1928, the
countryside became politicized again, this time thoroughly and extensively. Instead of
bourgeois nationalism, a hierarchical notion of national identity, within whose stratified
social order the landowner occupied the highest rung, became increasingly attractive to
Protestant landowners. It served, after all, to lend stability to their crisis-shaken selfimage. Where the bourgeois national idea rested on a doctrine of equality, the category
of the race or of the racial community (Volksgemeinschaft) provided for farmers, landowners, pastors, and schoolteachers some degree of mediation between the level of the
village and the level of national politics. It also helped to provide some grounding for
their political demands on the state. Using the ideology of the racial community, the
NSDAP succeeded in uniting the leaders of rural popular opinion. But the result was
not a unique new social milieu alongside the other, older milieus. Despite the gains
made by Hitler’s party among the rural evangelical population through its penetration
of the older conservative clubs and organizations, its successes were due rather to a
radical breakdown in the fundamental structure of the German party system.
Siegfried Weichlein
Humboldt University, Berlin
¨
Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfange der Bundesrepublik und die NSVergangenheit. By Norbert Frei.
Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996. Pp. 464. DM 78.
In a well-known “put-down” review, Moses Haddad declared that the book at hand
“fill[ed] a well-needed gap.” Alas, Norbert Frei’s Vergangenheitspolitik fills a gap that
has to be filled and, in so doing, both deals with and raises substantive issues with
regard to modern German history.
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Frei shows why a combination of circumstances was responsible for a rapid and
thoroughgoing suppression of concerns about Nazism within a very short time after the
conclusion of World War II. This is a very complex story, with a variety of themes
interwoven, but is, at times, disturbingly synoptic.
Demands posed by reconstruction, the beginnings of the Cold War, and the all-toohuman desire to minimize national guilt allowed for, in fact demanded, that painful
singularities attaching to Nazism be suppressed. Indeed, Frei points out, for many Germans it became very easy to conflate Nazi horrors with the miseries endured by the
German people during the last months of the war and in the period of confusion and
uncertainties following its conclusion. In a word, the musings of the late Andreas Hillgruber over the sufferings of the German people toward war’s end and the heroic performance of the Wehrmacht, particularly on the eastern front, in defending this people,
must be seen as grounded in a general German tendency toward self-pity.
With the emergence of the Cold War, German political and eventual military integration into the “West” came to be accepted as necessary. Thus, while individuals such as
John J. McCloy, the American High Commissioner for Germany, tried, on occasion, to
sustain the moral judgments flowing from the Nuremberg trials, and attendant efforts
at de-Nazification, the perceived post-1945 political realities necessitated that Germany
be allowed to engage in a comforting process of national amnesia.
For unreconstructed right-wingers who felt little, if any, guilt with regard to Nazi war
crimes and who had no burning desire for German “integration” into Western Europe,
this was a godsend. For Konrad Adenauer, since 1949 chancellor over a now militaryunoccupied West Germany, national amnesia became an expression of Realpolitik. Unlike those who represented the German right, such as the Deutsche Reichspartei—
which, along with communists, would in due course be abolished—Adenauer never
denied German war guilt. Yet, concerned about German participation in a unified Europe, and strongly anticommunist, he had to be sensitive to the concerns of the radical
right, concerns that found expression in elements of one of his coalition partners, the
supposedly “centrist” Freie Demokratische Partei. Thus, Adenauer, for reasons personal
and political, was driven to participate in a national fetish of forgetfulness. At the same
time, unlike those on the right, he was compelled to be sensitive to American and nonGerman European public opinion. After all, Germany would not be fully sovereign before fall 1954.
In the immediate postwar period, hundreds of Germans accused of war crimes were
“languishing” in jails throughout Western Europe. At the same time, the behavior of
the Wehrmacht was often under strong suspicion. Frei does a masterful job showing
how, because of German domestic pressures and Western concerns that Germany be
brought into NATO, legal jurisdiction over such people was gradually handed over to
German courts, which were relatively sympathetic to many of the defendants as matters
worked out, while a general rehabilitation of German soldiery took place. Even Dwight
David Eisenhower, a man genuinely appalled by Nazi atrocities, took part in this noxious process.
Thus, even before West Germany attained full sovereignty, a combination of Cold
War and domestic considerations was responsible for a kind of reverse de-Nazification
of West Germany. In a word, within an amazingly short period of time after the horrors
of Nazism had been revealed, many Germans were quite willing to forget them, while
Cold War considerations were responsible for Western concerns to trivialize such
matters.
Yet, there were still nagging doubts, and Adenauer was sensitive to them. As mentioned earlier, egregiously right-wing organizations—and some individuals as well—
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came under the purview of the emerging West German government. Some were
“brought to book,” and West Germany, in the eyes of those who viewed the country as
such, came to be perceived as a country in which both the radical left and the radical
right were being suppressed—a country that was thus an ideal participant in the European community—an Adenaurean dream. By 1955, when public memorials to the Holocaust were being planned, West Germany indeed, at least on the conscious level,
already had “mastered the past.” Adenauer’s own political concerns, foreign and domestic, fit hand in glove with foreign and domestic political needs and concerns.
In an interesting sort of sidelight to all of these considerations, prominent German
Jewish leaders, some survivors of death camps, were often reluctant to raise substantive
challenges to policies of forgetfulness, fearful, with good reason, as matters sometimes
turned out, that such could bring continued latent German antisemitism to the surface.
To be sure, there would be efforts, the most notable of them British, to make certain
that those accused of war crimes were brought to justice. For the most part, though,
Allied governments, which, even after West Germany attained sovereignty in October
1954, could have maintained strong influences with regard to the processing of those
accused of war crimes, allowed for releases, reduced sentences, and, as mentioned earlier, the deliverance of such folk to more lenient German courts. According to the author, this was, understandably, quite favorably received by the German public. After
initial protestations regarding the “politics of forgetfulness,” even Adenauer’s political
foes, the Social Democrats, for mostly tactical reasons, fell into line with major aspects
of such politics.
Thus, because of circumstances dictated by the Cold War, Konrad Adenauer’s sensitivity to them, and a mixture of national self-pity and, in some cases, no sense of guilt
whatsoever, “politics of the past” became congruent with this most recent of pasts being
trivialized or, in some cases, forgotten or denied. Not until the 1970s would large numbers of Germans, of another generation, make serious efforts to come to terms with it.
Frei’s courageous, and, in some ways, groundbreaking book, is to be read by those
with strong stomachs; people who, while unable to forgive the unforgivable, are able
to reject opinions grounded in beliefs in national character.
Robert A. Pois
University of Colorado
Carlo Schmid, 1896–1979: Eine Biographie. By Petra Weber.
Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996. Pp. 968. DM 98.
He heaved himself, a lug of a man,
up the steps onto the stage,
panting, and he gushed forth learned splatter
all over the assembled champs, mercilessly talking
and talking.
“Cease, oh cease the chatter!” plead the tormented listeners’ eyes.
But he shot off word after word—the guy just can’t
stop talking!—
one after the other, just as Ulysses of the legend
emptied his quiver.
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Petra Weber cites this self-ironic ditty by and about the post–World War II West German
statesman, leading Social Democrat, and bon vivant Carlo Schmid in the middle of her
massive biography (p. 309). He had placed these lines at the end of an elegy, “Battle of
the Giants at Bebenhausen,” which mocked his fellow combatants in a heated parliamentary debate over the critical postwar issue of land reform that had taken place earlier
that day in February 1948. The verse and the circumstances of its delivery tell the reader
a great deal about this immensely popular statesman, who held a remarkable moral
sway in the formative years of West Germany from the late 1940s through the end of
the 1960s without ever holding any of the very top offices. They mark Schmid as a man
of equal passion for politics and the philosophical and artistic. Though eager for political battle, he always preferred to come to a consensus at the end, and he did not spare
himself to achieve a good political climate. Confident of his rhetorical prowess with
which he crushed the best of opponents, including many a brilliant verbal victory over
the wily first West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, he nevertheless showed the
kind of gnawing self-doubt that speaks out of the ditty above, albeit brilliantly packaged
in boisterous self-mockery.
Weber’s use of this poem to explore Schmid’s role in the land reform debate is characteristic for this splendid biography. It allows her to move beyond the analysis of his
specific political and administrative actions to a deeper understanding of this remarkably cultured man in politics and, even more impressively, his impact on and interaction
with the unique political culture of West Germany in its first three decades of groping
toward democracy. In the process, she moves from the political to the artistic, philosophical, and pedagogical sides of his personality with the same ease as her subject
did. She reveals gifts as a cultural historian that go well beyond the reputation she has
already built as a historian of Social Democracy with her well-edited 1993 edition of
the 1949–57 SPD Bundestag delegation protocols (Die SPD-Fraktion im Deutschen
Bundestag: Sitzungsprotokolle [Dusseldorf, 1993]). The book is an intellectual delicacy, rich in sophisticated discussions of legal theory and literature as well as politics,
and its style at times waxes almost poetic.
Weber’s basic thesis is that Schmid was more than a top-flight intellectual and legal
theorist, whose greatest historical claim to fame is as “father of the (West) German
constitution.” He was more than a moderate, thoughtful, and rhetorically gifted statesman, who at critical points helped balance West Germany’s still conflicted and at times
unstable early democracy by mediating between the major parties and between centrists
and impatient leftists in his own party. She sees him as a man with two equally potent
souls—the political and the artistic—who, for all his extraordinary gifts and energy,
often had great difficulty keeping his own psychic balance. Acclaimed as a writer and
translator of fine prose and poetry, he was yet never satisfied with intellectual constructs
per se; in fact, he often expressed distrust of only intellectuals and their political judgments, even though he was quick to defend their right to express their views. His own
political ambition was strong. He passionately wanted to shape politics and society, and
he was ready to seek compromise and consensus in a politics of the possible to exert
influence and make a difference. Though not a blatant careerist, he fervently hoped to
reach one of the top positions of government—chancellor, foreign minister, federal
president, or at least president of parliament or minister of culture, none of which he
attained even though he was a state prime minister, a federal minister, and for many
years deputy president of the parliament and deputy chairman of his party.
Weber is a deeply empathetic biographer, but she is not blind to Schmid’s weaknesses. She readily acknowledges the many occasions when his vanity got in his way,
when he was wily in pursuit of political ambitions, misjudged situations, and sup-
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pressed some of his actions in his strongly pedagogical memoirs. Like so many men
and women accustomed to power, influence, and esteem, he left the political stage unwillingly and with considerable bitterness. He had his greatest moments in deepest
crisis situations—as occupation officer in France, in the face of total collapse in
1945–46 Germany, when the Allies appeared determined to veto a strong, sensibly federal constitution, and when in the 1955 Moscow negotiations the Soviets seemed unwilling to release the remaining German prisoners of war. Yet he found it harder to
sustain longer term influence at the top. One suspects that Schmid himself would have
been delighted that his biographer was still ready to engage with him critically in the
year of his hundredth birthday. Yet Weber evidently shares his nonideological, humane
socialism, even with its unabashed elitism; and she admires his devoted struggle for
close relations with his mother’s native land, France, for rapprochement with Poland
and the rest of Eastern Europe, for European integration, and, in opposition to the New
Left’s postnationalism, a love of nation, which included the dream for the eventual German reunification that he did not live to see. This splendid book, based on extensive
archival research in France and Germany, will undoubtedly remain the definitive biography of this fascinating political-cultural figure, whom Willy Brandt called “the secret
father of the free, democratic Germany.”
Diethelm Prowe
Carleton College
Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848–1918. By
Gary B. Cohen.
West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1996. Pp. xxi1386.
Gary B. Cohen’s latest book reminds historians of modern Europe that it is possible, if
rare, today to employ a complex empirical analysis in order to make important arguments about cultural identity and historical experience. In his first book (The Politics
of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861–1914 [Princeton, N.J., 1981]), a brilliant
study of the German-speaking community in nineteenth-century Prague, Cohen deployed a sophisticated local statistical study to analyze the larger construction of national and class identities in Austrian society. This time he examines the backgrounds
of secondary and university students in order to address questions of middle-class formation and social transformation in the Habsburg monarchy. Education and MiddleClass Society in Imperial Austria, 1848–1918 challenges several influential assumptions that have for too long structured thinking about imperial Austria’s middle classes.
In place of these tired arguments, Cohen’s book offers a nuanced, richly complex, and
comparative basis for examining the recruitment and comparative power of the Austrian
¨
Burgertum. In particular, Cohen asks whether secondary and higher education perpetuated the social power and cultural values of elite groups in the monarchy, the traditional
view, or whether it provided a means for members of diverse classes, ethnic groups,
and religious minorities to gain social advancement on their own terms?
Cohen’s first chapters trace changing educational policy in imperial Austria, starting
with the post-1848 reforms of Leo Thun, continuing with the generally expansionary
policies initiated by the liberals in the 1860s and 1870s, and followed by the antiliberal
backlash of the Taaffe years (1879–93). Here Cohen demonstrates the limits of state
policy in shaping the educational choices of young Austrians. Targeted expansion of
opportunity in the liberal era, for example, brought unexpected consequences in the
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form of growing general interest in higher education, a trend the antiliberal policy makers of the 1880s and 1890s, try as they might, simply could not reverse. Enrollment
numbers and specific educational choices (technical vs. classical secondary schools, for
example) may have reflected changing economic opportunities, particularly during the
depression years starting in 1873, but by 1900 demand for education had assumed its
own powerful dynamic quite apart from state policy and economic growth. As increasingly mass-based political movements linked educational opportunities more explicitly
to their own nationalist programs, the state could not ignore demands for expanded
opportunities in higher education.
In the most compelling section of the book, Cohen examines first the changing backgrounds of secondary and university students, and then their changing social experience. Here he also addresses difficult questions about the larger functions of the Austrian educational system and, indirectly, about the power and influence of middle-class
society in the empire. Did higher education serve to reproduce elite values and power,
or did it tend to break down those values by admitting an increasingly diverse group
into the ranks of the educated elites? Naturally, Cohen does not present the alternatives
in such simplistic terms. On the whole, however, his work uses empirically based arguments to suggest that Austrian society was far more “modern,” far more democratic, and
also far less paralyzed by nationalist conflict than historians have traditionally allowed.
It seems clear from Cohen’s statistical analyses that, in ethnic, religious, and class
terms, Austria’s secondary and university students constituted a remarkably diverse
group and that at least in ethnic and religious terms, this diversity increased steadily in
the period 1848–1914. As one might expect from his previous work, the author does
not shy away from complexity when he comes to speak about cultural identity. Cohen
consistently takes care to emphasize the contingency of the very identities he examines. His statistics never simplify German-speakers into German nationals, or Polishspeakers into Catholics, for example. He is carefully attuned to the nuances of local
constructions of cultural identity, as much for students in the Bukovina or Galicia as
for students in Bohemia, Moravia, or the Alpine lands. We learn that while those who
represented themselves as German-speakers maintained a far higher, if steadily declining, proportion of students than their numbers in the general population, Bohemia and
Moravia produced relatively more of these students than the economically more isolated Alpine lands. Similarly, the remarkable statistical growth in numbers of Polishspeaking students around the turn of the century often included hidden others like Jews,
Ukrainians, and foreign students. Cohen’s analysis also enables him to link particular
regional, ethnic, or religious groups to specific choices of faculty. Thus, in general
terms, for example, the Galician Polish and Alpine German Catholics preferred the
philosophical or theological faculties, while Jews chose medicine or law, and Protestants the technical faculties. It is a strength of Cohen’s analysis, however, that even these
generalizations are made not in static but in dynamic terms, as other factors came into
play to alter the educational strategies of particular ethnic, religious, or occupational
groups over time.
Cohen consistently places his analysis of the social background of students in the
context of comparable developments in the rest of Europe, particularly those in Germany. As in Prussia, for example, the largest numbers of secondary school graduates in
Austria came from lower middle-class backgrounds, the children of families without
property holdings or higher education. Within this larger category, however, the proportions of students from white-collar backgrounds increased significantly as those from
peasant and craft families slowly declined. And not surprisingly, matriculated students
at the Czech University or Technical College in Prague were far more likely to come

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.11 on Mon, 8 Sep 2014 10:28:29 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Book Reviews

973

from lower middle-class backgrounds than their counterparts at the German universities
and technical colleges who generally came from higher, more educated social backgrounds. There were noticeable differences between Austria and the German states as
well: Austrian secondary schools and universities, for example, produced comparatively more graduates from families of wage workers. And the number of students from
propertied families grew more in Germany, where faster and earlier economic development strengthened the size and relative representation of the commercial, financial, and
industrial classes.
One of the hallmarks of Cohen’s previous work has been his ability to relate local
events to larger developments at the state level, to connect the situation of the individual
to the construction of collective social identities. Although his first book more clearly
articulated the different elements of micro- and macrohistories, this book makes sense
precisely because of its attentiveness to local context in forging its larger theoretical
arguments. If anything, this reviewer wished the book could have been longer in order
to make room for even more local examples.
Historians of Central Europe owe Cohen an enormous debt of gratitude. His work
invites us to discard popular but unproven paradigms and to view the society of imperial
Austria in dynamic new terms. And, in a time of increasing polarization within academe
over questions of method, Cohen’s authoritative voice demonstrates how creative and
careful empirical study can help to answer the most difficult historical questions about
cultural identity.
Pieter M. Judson
Swarthmore College
The Road to Romanian Independence. By Frederick Kellogg.
West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1995. Pp. xvi1265. $32.95.
The Road to Romanian Independence represents a slightly revised and enlarged (by a
single chapter) version of Frederick Kellogg’s 1969 dissertation, “Rumanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy, 1866–1878.” 1 (There is no indication of this, however,
either in a note or in the bibliography.) Kellogg’s theses, which arrived twenty-six years
ago, remain basically unchanged although more recent publications have been added to
the bibliography.
Kellogg’s central theme is the influence of the diplomacy and foreign policy of the
major European powers on the Romanian policy of independence, which formed a
central component of Romanian nationalism in the period between 1866 and 1880. It
came at the end of a period in which Romania belonged to the Ottoman Empire as a
half-independent duchy; at the same time, since the Paris Treaty of 1856 Romania had
possessed a collective guarantee of its autonomy by the major European powers. The
beginning and ending dates, marking the election of Carol the First of the House of
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen as the Prince of Romania in 1866 and the final recognition
of an independent Romania by the European powers in 1880, delimit an important
period in the gradual emergence of Romania as an independent state. One important
goal of Romanian nationalism, complete independence, received a vigorous boost
through the selection of a foreigner as prince, who pursued this goal consistently. Such
1
Frederick Kellogg, “Rumanian Nationalism and European Diplomacy, 1866–1878” (Ph.D. diss.,
Indiana University, 1969).
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a policy necessarily clashed with the interests of the Ottoman leadership, but it also led
to conflicts with the guarantee powers, whose differing interests in the Balkans were
affected by the Romanian demands. On the one hand, the half-independent status of
the country permitted the guarantee powers to intervene directly and repeatedly into
disputed issues in Romanian politics and to exert pressure on the country. On the other
hand, the collective guarantee did provide the Romanians a measure of security in foreign policy and a certain freedom to maneuver. Romania was often able to exploit the
prevailing disunity among the great powers to its own advantage.
Kellogg investigates the areas of conflict that led to political differences and competing claims between Romania and the great powers: for example, the election of a foreign prince, the Jewish question, the status of foreigners, support for neighboring
independence movements, railroad construction, the ratification of trade agreements,
Romanian policy in the Orient crisis of 1875–78, participation in the Russian-Turkish
War of 1877, and the preconditions for international recognition of the independence
that had already been proclaimed in 1877. Kellogg still maintains, though not as vigorously as he did in his 1969 dissertation, that the European interventions served to stimulate Romanian nationalism (p. 80). Conversely, one can interpret independence as a
fundamental position that Romania sought to have recognized by the European powers.
The author illustrates the mutual interaction of “challenge and response” between the
Romanian quest for autonomy and for its own place among the independent states of
Europe, on the one hand, and the interests of the great powers, on the other. Kellogg
attempts to set the impulse and strategies of Romanian nationalism within the context
of the conflicts among the great powers. In view of Romania’s unique geopolitical situation at the crossroads of three great powers, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and AustriaHungary, this perspective turns out to be a fruitful one, provided that this interpretive
scheme is not seen as the only possible one, and Romania is not viewed exclusively as
a victim of the interests of the great powers.
Kellogg views the period under investigation as a transitional phase. At the start,
Romania’s dependent status was somewhat counterbalanced by its protected status in
foreign affairs. At its conclusion, Romania had achieved full sovereignty but its position
in foreign affairs had become uncertain. The Romanians were willing to pay this price
for their independence. Kellogg speaks of a process of maturation (p. 229), which implies a process of experience and learning to deal with the European powers. But the
presentation of certain developments remains superficial because Kellogg for the most
part forgoes a critical analysis and appraisal of Romanian politics. The contradictory
qualities of Romanian nationalism in its confrontation with the major powers, its stabilizing as well as its destabilizing consequences, and its offensive as well as its defensive
character are not brought out clearly enough. Some decisions are difficult to understand
without a knowledge of internal political events. Domestically, this was not a peaceful
period (p. 229). Precisely during the years 1866–71, the country was in the grip of a
deep leadership crisis. Some statements, dates, and interpretations require correction.2
To give one example, Bismarck’s enormous pressure on the prince, and not the international impact of the Jewish question, led to the resignation of the radical-liberal government of N. Golescu in November 1868. A statement by the prince about the loss of
Bessarabia (p. 190) is interpreted by Kellogg in an opposite sense, and this leads him
to a mistaken appraisal of the prince’s position on this question. In a similar fashion he
misinterprets the neutrality policy in the Orient crisis of 1876 when he claims that it
2
The incorrect data (p. 132, n. 54) regarding the circular note of L. Catargiu from January 4–16,
1876, are misleading.
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was only good on paper (p. 124). In fact the Romanians observed a strict policy of
neutrality in an effort to further their claim to their own neutral status, to be guaranteed
by the great powers. After independence, this was the second most important goal of
Romanian foreign policy. It was only when this aim could not be reached that they gave
up their declared neutrality and sided with Russia in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877,
in order to legitimate their independence militarily.
On some foreign policy topics, Kellogg’s study complements a more extensive work
with a similar title written by a German historian.3 In other respects, it does not achieve
as much. This is the first study in English to treat this important period in Romanian
history and, as a consequence, to shed light on an unfamiliar corner of European diplomatic history. It is based on an extensive study of the sources and the factual material.
The book has a good apparatus, including a solid bibliography, a listing of the cabinet
members for the relevant years, and an index. It communicates to the reader the specific
problems of Romania during the age of nationalism. It also takes into account current
interest in the region and in the historical roots of contemporary nationalism in the
Balkan countries.
Edda Binder-Iijima
Eppelheim, Germany
¨
¨
Die Moskauer Medici: Der russische Burger als Mazen, 1850–1917. By
Waltraud Bayer.
¨
Vienna: Bohlau Verlag, 1996. Pp. 235.
For decades following the Bolshevik Revolution, scholars depicted imperial Russia’s
commercial-industrial elite as a “missing bourgeoisie.” This absent class not only oppressed the urban proletariat in a highly exploitative manner, it failed to realize its most
essential historical mission, the spearheading of a modern liberal opposition to the monarchy. Informed by a Marxist model of the French Revolution, Russian intellectuals and
subsequent generations of historians blamed the missing bourgeoisie for the empire’s
economic “backwardness” and for the late imperial (and subsequent Soviet) divergence
from the “Western” path of democratic capitalist development. With the advent of the
“new social history” and the gradual opening of many Russian archives over the past
thirty years, more complex and sympathetic appraisals of the tsarist bourgeoisie have
emerged. Less ideological, better researched, and at times excessively celebratory accounts of commercial-industrial groups reveal levels of cultural sophistication, public
activity, and political participation comparable to those of better-known (and more popular) elites, such as the nobility, intelligentsia, and professions. Waltraud Bayer’s balanced study of art patronage among representatives of the Moscow business class exemplifies this valuable historiographical correction. Based largely on printed primary
and secondary sources, with a sprinkling of archival documents, Die Moskauer Medici
traces the contributions of businessmen to the Russian art world from the time of the
Crimean War until the collapse of the Old Regime in 1917.
Focusing on pictorial art and crafts, Bayer describes two generations of Moscow
patrons whose evolution paralleled the appearance of a modern middle-class culture
(and self-consciousness), characterized by patriotic sentiments and unprecedented
¨
¨
¨
3
Lothar Maier, Rumanien auf dem Weg zur Unabhangigkeitserklarung, 1866–1877: Schein und
¨
¨ ¨
Wirklichkeit liberaler Verfassung und staatlicher Souveranitat (Munchen, 1989).
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involvement in public life. The first generation of bourgeois collectors, born between
1820 and 1850, entered a social arena already inhabited by art patrons from the court
and nobility. Remaining relatively close to the patriarchal, orthodox values of the countryside, this generation favored native religious, landscape, and realist genre painting.
Although their taste in art can be called “traditional,” their patronage goals extended
well beyond the satisfaction of personal needs. In addition to collecting art and supporting painters, businessmen cooperated with the Slavophile nobility to establish cultural
organizations, private galleries, and public museums. They also deliberately set out to
popularize art by educating the public. In this spirit, P. M. Tret’iakov (1832–98) founded
a unique public gallery that became the cornerstone for a Russian national museum.
During the 1860s and 1870s, a period of intensified societal initiative inaugurated by
military defeat in the Crimea and the great reforms of Alexander II, growing numbers
of patrons and painters devoted their resources and talents to the creation of realistic
renderings of national history and contemporary life. From the 1880s, they added the
preservation and production of native (peasant) handicrafts to their cultural agenda.
Their commitment to indigenous styles and themes, which at midcentury had implied
a separation from the classical canons of official academy art, quickly became an integrative force uniting the state, nobility, educated elites, and economic bourgeoisie.
By the 1890s, a second generation of “bourgeois” patrons, born between 1850 and
1880, rose to prominence. Socially and economically more diverse than the older group,
this generation comprised nobles who had adopted a middle-class lifestyle, the upper
echelons of the commercial-industrial elite (including representatives of minorities),
professionals, and academics. Their collecting habits were similarly varied. No longer
content to promote popular realism, the younger Moscow patrons embraced new modernist and avant-garde orientations from Western Europe and Russia. Interest in religious and folk art continued, indicating the full elasticity of a novel middle-class aesthetics. Alongside the diversification of a common aesthetics, social and cultural
distinctions between the producers and buyers of art became less pronounced. An expanding market allowed artists greater economic independence. Higher levels of education and the accumulation of wealth transformed middle-class patrons into art critics
and amateur painters. The organization of exhibits and involvement in artistic and literary journals appealed to a wide range of educated people. Private salons and galleries
enhanced personal contacts between painters and patrons whose sometimes antagonistic politics and lifestyles in no way dampened their shared desire to propagate art and
modernism in life. Increasingly, elite culture constituted an emergent “bourgeois public sphere.”
Despite the originality and pan-European significance of Russian cultural production
in the reign of Nicholas II, literature remains the only form of artistic expression that
is relatively well studied. Bayer’s attractive book offers a fascinating, accessible glimpse
of prerevolutionary art culture that should stimulate further research. The book provides
a small sampling of high-quality reproductions as well as basic information about individual patrons and specific organizations and publications. The author also indirectly
addresses crucial theoretical and historiographical themes, such as the development of
“civil society” and a Habermasian “bourgeois public sphere.” She frames the development of Moscow patronage in terms of a self-conscious middle class committed to
public service, free expression, and the idea of Russianness. This interpretation is appropriate; however, the relationship between patronage and the evolving social structure
(or changes in social consciousness) remains problematic. Recent research shows that,
by the late eighteenth century, culturally sophisticated and socially engaged merchant
groups played visible public roles in the capitals and provinces. In addition, a self-

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.11 on Mon, 8 Sep 2014 10:28:29 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Book Reviews

977

defined reading public (publika) of mixed social origins, united through multiple sites
of sociability, had formed. The story Bayer tells, while substantive in its own right, also
belongs to the larger context of Enlightenment culture as it evolved in Russia from
the time of Peter the Great. This was not an exclusively noble or Westernized culture,
superseded in the nineteenth century by a new, socially differentiated, and nationalminded bourgeois culture. It was, like the cultural milieu Bayer analyzes, a broad-based
literate, secular culture encompassing economic, noble, official, and educated elites—
including women and minorities—whose beliefs, thinking, and sensibilities derived
from an amalgam of Russian Orthodox, native ethnological, and European neoclassical
and Enlightenment sources.
Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Accounting for War: Soviet Production, Employment, and the Defence Burden,
1940–1945. By Mark Harrison. Cambridge Russian, Soviet, and Post-Soviet
Studies, volume 99. Edited by Stephen White et al.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxiv1338. $59.95.
This is an extremely important book, but it is not an easy one to read. The text is only
170 pages long, but it contains fifty-seven tables, and it is supported by fourteen statistical appendixes with another eighty-three tables on an additional 120 dense pages. I
doubt whether many will read the entire book including the appendixes, but I am also
sure that this book will be very widely cited. This book is the only critical account of
one of the most important economic topics of twentieth-century history. It reconstructs
and analyzes the statistical record necessary to provide an economic explanation of how
the Soviet economy was able to absorb the effects of the massive German attack in
World War II, and outproduce the war effort of Germany and occupied continental Europe. This achievement of the Soviet economy was quite remarkable. As Mark Harrison
points out, “In both the world wars . . . when poor countries of similar or even somewhat more advanced development level and economic structure [as the USSR] were
subjected to massive attack, . . . their economies soon disintegrated. This did not happen
in the Soviet case” (p. 171). The importance of the fact that the Soviet economy did not
collapse under the strain of World War II should not be underestimated. Recently, Western triumphalist claims that the Soviet experiment has been shown to be a total failure
have tended to obscure this very important earlier success.
Prior to the publication in 1991 of the 1959 Soviet statistical handbook on the Soviet
economy in 1941–45, the only quantitative information on how the Soviet war economy
worked was a series of selective revelations of odd and occasionally contradictory secret figures, which various privileged Soviet officials had been authorized to reveal
(Voznesenskii, head of Gosplan; Sukharevskii, head of sector of national economic
balances in Gosplan; and a few Soviet historians). This information had been uncritically incorporated into both Western and Soviet economic histories of the period and
had served as the very limited basis for previous Western assessments of Soviet economic performance during the war. Harrison takes us beyond these very limited sources
and introduces us to the wealth of Soviet archival materials on the different aspects of
the economy. He uses these materials to reconstruct the series of data on industrial
production, gross national product (GNP), employment, and foreign trade, with an indi-
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cation of how much of these items were devoted to military production and how much
to the civilian sector.
Harrison’s account is thoroughly quantitative, and he is naturally a little defensive of
the widespread suggestion that all statistics are either lies or simply collections of anecdotes and that Soviet statistics were worse. Harrison takes a sophisticated but realistic
attitude to what Soviet statistics can show us: “There is no single, objective truth waiting to be discovered beneath the surface of the lie. The Soviet GNP is not a hidden
number awaiting discovery, but an aggregation of assumptions and hypotheses about a
multi-dimensional reality which resists reduction to a unique figure” (p. 4) and “Soviet
GNP can be measured” (p. 170).
Harrison points out that in 1940 the countries that would become the Allies overall
had twice the population of the Axis powers, 2.7 times their gross domestic product
(measured in 1985 international dollars), and consequently overall averaged 1.4 times
their productivity per capita. With overwhelming population and economic resources,
the Allies were bound to win in the long run if none of their members were individually
knocked out along the way. But in the short term, the problems on the eastern front
were massive, especially after the Soviet losses in the first year of the war (1941–42).
Harrison’s GNP series show that Soviet GNP fell by a third between 1940 and 1942
and that the defense burden increased from 17 percent of all GNP in 1940 to 61 percent
in 1942. Harrison explains the remarkable failure of the Soviet economy not to collapse
under such a strain in terms of “the Soviet institutional capacity to manage shortages
and distribute the defence burden” (pp. 126). This is further unpacked and explained as
“the capacity to define priorities, to ration steel and power to the top priority users and
deny these commodities to everyone else, to ration labour among the armed forces,
defence industry, and the civilian economy when each sector required far more than
was available, and to ration food among consumers when there was not enough food to
keep everyone alive” (pp. 126). Harrison concludes: “This capacity made the difference
between Russian defeat in World War I, and Soviet victory in World War II” (p. 126).
An important section of this work looks at the scale and importance of Allied aid to
the Soviet Union, and although Harrison concludes that this accounted for far more
than the “only 4 percent” often cited in Soviet texts, he nevertheless argues that they
were not substantial in the early critical stages of the war when the Soviet Union was
absorbing the main thrust of German attack and that they only became significant after
the main battles of Stalingrad and Kursk had been fought by early 1943. The effect of
substantial U.S. aid in this later period speeded up the German withdrawal, which was
as much to the interest of the United States and United Kingdom, as it ultimately diminished their human losses. Harrison suggests that, instead of seeing this exclusively in
terms of economic aid from the rich to the poor, it should be seen to some extent as a
transaction in human lives in which the richer countries were minimizing the losses of
life of their soldiers by subsidizing a poorer country to do more of the fighting and
dying for them. Ultimately, however, it was in the interests of both the United States
and the USSR that Germany be defeated as quickly as possible.
The chapter on war losses surveys both demographic losses and other losses to the
economy and argues that unlike the other countries these were permanent losses. The
argument here is not simply that after the recovery process the overall trend was starting
from a lower level but that the potential growth was retarded by technological inefficiencies introduced into the war economy because of such things as inefficient allocation and suboptimal scales of production.
In general, this book is a remarkable tour de force opening up for serious academic
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investigation an important area that had previously only been studied at the superficial
level of anecdotes and selective revelations. The only criticisms that could be made of
the book would be the failure to carry the analysis further. How did the institutional
capacity to manage shortages and distribute the defense burden work? What exactly
were the technological inefficiencies that were introduced into the war economy that
resulted in subsequent losses of inefficiency? And how was domestic Soviet agriculture
operating? But, as Harrison points out, such questions set the agenda for future research.
Stephen G. Wheatcroft
University of Melbourne
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